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RÉSUMÉ 
Dans le livre «The Machine that Changed the World», Womack et son équipe du MIT ont 
réalisé une étude portant sur le phénomène japonais dans l‟industrie automobile au début 
des années 90. Les membres concluent que le Japon avait utilisé une arme secrète pour 
ainsi dépasser les États-Unis et devenir le pays le plus puissant dans la fabrication des 
automobiles. Cette arme est connue comme Lean production. Depuis, Lean production 
s‟est étendu dans les industries partout dans le monde.   
Depuis deux ans, la Chine est devenue simultanément le premier marché et producteur 
des automobiles. Une question fondamentale reste à savoir s‟il s‟agit seulement d‟un 
déplacement d‟entreprises, ou si l‟on vit l‟émergence d‟un nouveau modèle de production.  
Cette étude examine d‟abord l‟histoire de l‟industrie automobile dans le monde, où celle 
de la Chine doit être prise en considération sérieuse. La visite des quatre entreprises 
automobiles chinoises, tant locale qu‟européenne et japonaise montre qu‟il existe une 
grande variabilité de modèles qui coexistent en Chine et qu‟il serait sans doute prématuré 
de parler de nouveau modèle de production. La mise en œuvre de Lean production et 
l‟application de la nouvelle gestion et des méthodes de production sera ainsi étudiée. Il 
est remarqué que différentes méthodes sont utilisées en Chine. Par exemple, les 
entreprises étrangères en Chine possèdent des usines à très haut taux d‟automatisation, 
assez conventionnelles par rapport aux modèles classiques, alors que les entreprises 
locales restent beaucoup plus utilisatrices en main-d‟œuvre. Il est également constaté que 
Modular production se pratique très bien, même mieux que Lean production. Par ailleurs, 
l‟imitation est aussi une approche importante au cours du processus de développement, 
bien que certains problèmes de droits et de brevets existent.  
Ce projet de recherche permettra aux lecteurs de comprendre le nouveau développement 
de l‟industrie automobile chinoise. Il sera également question de la gestion et du 
développement de la production en Chine, son passé historique, l‟état actuel et un avenir 
glorieux.  
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ABSTRACT 
In the book « The Machine that Changed the World », Womack and his colleagues 
studied the Japanese automobile industry in the 1990s and concluded that Japanese used a 
secret weapon to surpass the U.S. and became the biggest automobile manufacturing 
country. This secret weapon is known as Lean production. From then on, Lean 
production has been expanding in all industries around the world.  
Two years ago, China became the biggest automobile producer and the largest 
automobile market in the world. This situation stimulates a fundamental question whether 
it is just an economic change or there is an emergence of a new production model? 
This study first reviews the history of automobile industry in the world, where Chinese 
history is focused on. Four representative automobile companies are investigated in 
details, within which three are joint venture companies and one is a domestic company. 
The implement of Lean production and the application of new management and 
production methods are studied. It is found that different methods are applied in China, 
where joint venture companies usually have high executive levels and the domestic ones 
only use a cheap labor approach. It is also found that Modular production is well 
practiced in China, which is even better than the Lean production. Imitation is also an 
important approach during the development process, although some law and patent 
problems exist.  
This research will allow us to understand the new development of automobile industry in 
China better. It will also deliver some important information for the management and 
production development in China, its past history, the current status and the glorious 
future.  
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ iii 
RÉSUMÉ ......................................................................................................................................... iv 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................... v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ vi 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF APPENDICES .................................................................................................................. x 
NOMENCLATURE ........................................................................................................................ xi 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 1:  LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................ 3 
1.1 The history of automobile industry in the world ................................................................... 3 
1.1.1 The United States automobile industry .............................................................. 4 
1.1.2 Europe automobile industry ................................................................................ 8 
1.1.3 Japan automobile industry ................................................................................ 11 
1.1.4 Korea automobile industry ................................................................................ 16 
1.2 The history of Chinese automobile industry........................................................................ 18 
1.2.1 Independent manufacturing .............................................................................. 18 
1.2.2 Joint venture companies .................................................................................... 20 
1.2.3 Imitation and innovation ................................................................................... 23 
1.3 Chinese automobile industry map ....................................................................................... 28 
1.4 Chinese government policies ............................................................................................... 30 
1.5 Outcome of the literature review ......................................................................................... 34 
CHAPTER 2:  METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................ 36 
2.1 Research methods ................................................................................................................ 36 
2.2 Questionnaire development ................................................................................................. 37 
2.3 Data collection ..................................................................................................................... 37 
vii 
 
CHAPTER 3:  CASE STUDY ...................................................................................................... 38 
3.1Shanghai Volkswagen .......................................................................................................... 38 
3.1.1 Assembly shop ..................................................................................................... 40 
3.1.2 Department of procurement .............................................................................. 41 
3.1.3 Department of sales ............................................................................................ 42 
3.2 Shanghai GM ....................................................................................................................... 45 
3.2.1 GMS system ........................................................................................................ 46 
3.2.2 Supply chain optimization ................................................................................. 48 
3.2.3 CRM system ........................................................................................................ 50 
3.2.4 Green strategy ..................................................................................................... 51 
3.3 Chongqing Changan Suzuki ................................................................................................ 52 
3.4 BYD Auto Company ........................................................................................................... 54 
CHAPTER 4:  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ........................................................................... 59 
4.1 Data display and analysis .................................................................................................... 59 
4.1.1 Assembly shop ..................................................................................................... 59 
4.1.2 Department of procurement .............................................................................. 63 
4.1.3 Department of sales ............................................................................................ 66 
4.2 What‟s more ........................................................................................................................ 67 
4.3 Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 68 
4.3.1 Lean production in China .................................................................................. 69 
4.3.2 Modular production in China ........................................................................... 70 
4.3.3 New direction in China ...................................................................................... 71 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 74 
REFERENCE ................................................................................................................................ 75 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................... 80 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1:  The imported cars in China between 1981-1985 ................................................. 21 
Table 4.1:  Survey data from the assembly shop ................................................................... 61 
Table 4.2:  Survey data from the department of procurement ............................................... 64 
Table 4.3:  Survey data from the department of sales ........................................................... 67 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1: Vehicle productions in different countries in certain years................................... 4 
Figure 1.2: 1900-1940 vehicle output in the U.S., Japan and five countries in Europe. ....... 14 
Figure 1.3: 1946-1987 vehicle output in the U.S., Japan and five countries in Europe. ....... 14 
Figure 1.4: 1997-2009 vehicle output in the U.S., Japan and five countries in Europe. ....... 15 
Figure 1.5: Transition diagram of global automobile industry .............................................. 15 
Figure 1.6: 1953-1982 vehicle and car production in China ................................................. 20 
Figure 1.7: Vehicle output of China in 1953-2009 ................................................................ 27 
Figure 1.8: Market shares of national brands passenger cars in China ................................. 27 
Figure 1.9: China vehicle manufacturing map ...................................................................... 29 
Figure 3.1: Shanghai Volkswagen total car sales .................................................................. 39 
Figure 3.2: Car production of Shanghai Volkswagen in different years ............................... 39 
Figure 4.1: Number of components suppliers in 2010 for four representative companies .... 65 
Figure 4.2: Engineering carried out by suppliers in 2010 for four representative companies 66 
  
x 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
 
APPENDICES A: MAJOR QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS………………………………………...80 
   
APPENDICES B: CAR BRANDS IN CHINA…………………………………………………..83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
AMC    American Motor Corporation 
BYD    Build Your Dreams 
CDC    Customer Development Center 
CKD    Complete Knock-Down kit 
CRM    Customer Relationship Management 
DKD    Direct Knock-Down kit 
EDI     Electronic Data Interchange 
ERP    Enterprise Resource Planning 
FAW    First Automobile Works 
FDI    Foreign Direct Investment 
GM    General Motors Corporation 
GMS    General Manufacture System 
JIT    Just-In-Time 
KD    Knock-Down kit 
LLM    Leading Logistics Management 
MBTI    Modularity-Based Technology Innovation 
MID    Modularity In Design 
MIP    Modularity In Production 
MIU    Modularity In Use 
MIT    Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MITI    Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
OEM    Original Equipment Manufacturer     
OTD    Order To Deliver   
RDC    Re-Distribution Center  
xii 
 
SGM    Shanghai General Motors 
SKD    Semi Knock-Down kit 
SMS    Short Messaging Service 
SOA    Service-Oriented Architecture 
SPC    Statistical Process Control 
SVW    Shanghai Volkswagen Corporation 
TQC    Total Quality Control 
UK    United Kingdom  
USSR    Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VA    Value Analysis 
VE    Value Engineering 
WEC    World Environment Center  
WTO    World Trade Organization 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The automobile industry is growing rapidly in emerging countries. Overall, 40% vehicles 
in the world are produced in China, India or Brazil today. Among them, China holds the 
leading position and produces more than 25% vehicles in the world. Meanwhile, China 
had become the world‟s largest market since 2009 (Center & Association, 2009). 
Automobile industry has existed for more than a century. During this period, the 
manufacturing center is changing continuously. Womack‟s team (Womack, Jones, & 
Roos, 1990) investigated many automobile companies in different countries to 
understand the mechanisms leading to this transformation. He concluded that the 
appearance of new management was the reason for the transformation. Following this 
thought, it is easy to bring a question if there is any new practice or method accomplished 
with the massive growth in China? 
Looking back the history, the automobile industry started from western countries. It was 
mostly concentrated in Europe and the U.S. In the late nineteenth century, German 
engineer Karl Benz and American Henry Ford built four-wheel cars almost at the same 
time. Soon Henry Ford and his colleagues brought the U.S. into car era dependent on his 
T-model cars and assembly line (Wild, 1975). This was the famous Mass production 
period. Later when Europe automobile industry abandoned its adherence to noble origin 
and introduced the popular car concept, Europe came into car era too.  
The U.S. and Europe had kept ahead in the world automobile industry from the beginning 
to the middle of the 20th century. They were characterized by capital monopoly and 
technology advancement. However, due to the world economic recession, energy crisis, 
market competition and other factors which influenced the automobile industry, the 
development in western countries has been slowed down since 1970s. The U.S. vehicles 
production fluctuated year after year, and the Europe vehicles production also stagnated 
from then on. 
Japanese automobile industry started its fast development after World War II. By 
learning Mass production from the U.S. and developing Lean production, Japan 
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surpassed the U.S. and reached the top level in automobile manufacturing. Toyota and 
Honda were the most prominent representatives. Until 1980s, Japanese had created 
numerous self-owned brands such as Lexus, Acura, Infiniti, etc. Soon Korean cars 
followed and emerged in the world market, with low price and fast-growing market share.   
In order to survive in the fierce competition, the major western automobile companies 
started the step of exporting capital and technology instead of exporting products. 
Outsourcing became one of the most important practices. With this practice they tried to 
cut cost and got positive results. Under this background, Modular production was 
introduced into some developing countries.  New technologies and equipments were also 
spread into these countries and soon they realized the leap from importing to exporting 
cars. Brazil and Korea are their representatives. However, the practice of Modular 
production is different in different countries and different companies, hence it was still a 
fuzzy concept until today (Takeishi & Fujimoto, 2001).  
It can be concluded that new innovation and management always push industry going 
forward. In the process of pursuing new technologies, imitation also emerged as an 
important approach. Imitation was applied first in some developing countries and has 
achieved remarkable improvement today. This is also true for Chinese automobile 
industry. However, in one hand, China bears many features as a developing country; in 
the other hand, China has large population and complete industrial system. It may create 
large difference to the other areas of the world. Hence the objectives of this study will be: 
1) how the Lean production was implemented in China; 2) what are the management 
methods in Chinese automobile industry; 3) which new phenomenon appears in China. 
This study is organized as follows: Chapter I goes through the literature review, which is 
mostly about the history of automobile industry and surrounds the clue of three important 
production methods; Chapter II describes the methodology, which includes research 
method, questionnaire development, and data collection; Chapter III presents detailed 
cases study of four representative automobile companies in China; Chapter IV displays 
and discusses the results of the investigation; Finally, a general conclusion is given for 
this research. 
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CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 The history of automobile industry in the world 
Since the invention of the first car in 1896, automobile manufacturing has gradually 
become one of the most important industries in the world. This industry is commonly 
recognized as a driver of many other industries such as mechanical industry, chemical 
industry, electrical industry, service industry, etc. (Fu, 2006), and is encouraged by many 
governments for economic and employment reasons. 
As a capital and technology intensive industry, automobile manufacturing has always 
been a source of management improvement and innovation. These improvement and 
innovation are usually connected with technology development, consumer demand, labor 
cost, as well as different market characteristics (Lu & Mu, 2003; Wild, 1975). As a result, 
each country has its distinctive  path in the development of automobile industry (Dosi, 
1982). 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Ford Motor Company created the famous 
assembly line. With this new method, automobile manufacturing changed from the 
inefficient single-pieces production process to Mass production. Dependent on this, the 
U.S. automobile productivity increased greatly during this period and automobiles 
became popular means of transportation in the world. Automobile manufacturing, first 
time named as an industry, was accepted by the public (Wild, 1975). 
From the seventy of the twentieth century, Japanese automobile industry developed very 
fast, based on its strong pre-war industry. Toyota Motor Corporation invented Lean 
production where more varieties, less batch production were adopted in vehicles 
manufacturing, and high quality and low fuel consumption were also achieved (Teresko, 
2005). Toyota soon surpassed the U.S. colleagues and became one of the most successful 
auto makers in the world. Automobile was known as “The machine that changed the 
world” from that time (Womack, et al., 1990).  
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In recent 20 years, Chinese automobile industry is growing very fast, along with its fast 
growing market. When the major developed countries were hit by the global economic 
crisis from 2008, Chinese automobile production and sales still increased and approached 
14 million in 2010 (Center & Association, 2009). China now has surpassed the U.S. and 
became the top one vehicle maker and consumer in the world. Meanwhile, Chinese own-
brand cars such as BYD, Chery, Jeely, etc. started to occupy a large portion of the 
Chinese market. The vehicles production comparing with U.S. and Japan is showed in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.1 Vehicle productions in different countries in certain years 
(Source from the World Automobile Manufacturers Association and Chinese Automobile 
Manufacturers Association) 
1.1.1 The United States automobile industry 
At the end of the 19th century, the U.S. economy had already reached a very high level. 
The total industrial production was on the top of the world. Major industries such as steel, 
oil and chemical developed fast and created condition for the appearance of automobile 
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industry. At that time, the U.S. also had capital and technology to promote the invention 
and creativity, and hence had the potential to bring out the automobile industry. 
In 1890s, the American automobile industry started with hundreds of car producers. 
Different technologies such as internal combustion engines, battery-powered electric 
engines and steam engines were used in automobile production. Charles Duryea and J. 
Frank Duryea are the first two car markers in the U.S. Ransom Olds in his Oldsmobile 
factory first introduced assembly line in 1901. In 1909, Ford Auto Company invented 
model T car which could meet the customer‟s purchasing power. From then, automobile 
was not monopoly for the rich people but many common people could afford a model T 
car, even for an assembly line worker. The climax of universal car appeared in the U.S.  
With the advent of assembly line, automobile manufacturing had been changed from 
inefficient single-pieces processing to mass production. Dependent on this technology, 
automobile production increased greatly and the automobile became an important tool for 
transportation in the U.S. Automobile manufacturing was named as an industry for the 
first time and accepted by the public (Wild, 1975). Mass production was hence defined as: 
the production of large amounts of standardized products on production lines. It was also 
called “flow production” and was applied to many other industries thereafter. 
The assembly line reduced producing time greatly so that the production cost was cutting 
down. In this wave, Ford was the first Mass production car maker in the world, and also 
used many other efficiency management methods. Hence, Fordism became a famous 
production theory and was copied by other major industries. Also in this time, General 
Motors Corporation was built. These two big carmakers led the flouring of the U.S. 
automobile industry.  
Model T started a new era for the U.S. vehicle manufacturing. This car occupied most of 
the auto market over 20 years. In 1927, Model T was produced in a volume of 15 million, 
which was a merit in the industrial history. However, during this period Ford Auto 
Company paid more attention on the cost, while little improvement was made on 
developing new models. At the same time, automobile manufacturing was getting mature 
and more and more people possess cars. In this situation, Model T seemed to be poor and 
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monotonous. By 1927, GM Chevrolet cars with luxury accessories were produced and 
much welcomed by the customers. GM firstly established the Department of Art and 
Color. Automobiles specially designed for rich people became a new tendency. 
Thereafter, the standardization and integration of car parts emerged in the U.S. 
automobile industry. Aluminum body and power brakes were also used in the U.S. In 
1925, Chrysler - the third carmaker in the U.S. was founded. In 1929, the U.S. auto 
production and sales broke 500 million. 
Soon GM and Chrysler became the first and second automobile manufacturing 
companies. These two giants took similar strategies to acquire other auto brands and 
introduced new models every year. Technology innovation helped them realize giant leap. 
Many other automakers also rapidly expanded. The U.S. automobile industry occupied 
the absolute position in this time (May, 1990). 
It is worth of mention that during the very early years of the U.S. automobile industry, 
automobile industry was restricted by the poor road condition. In 1916, the Federal Road 
Act and Federal Highway Act invested on road construction, and the government‟s 
support promoted the development of the U.S. automobile industry. 
During the Great Depression, the U.S. automobile industry suffered huge losses, 
especially for the luxury carmakers. Stutz Motor Car Company, Pierce-Arrow Motor Car 
Company and others had to be out of their business. Under the economic pressure, new 
technologies had to be introduced and applied in automobile industry to improve 
competition ability. Synchromesh manual transmissions, automatic transmissions, 
hydraulic brakes, independent front suspension and so on were widely adopted during 
this period.  
During World War II, the U.S. automobile industry was turned into war industry and 
made military tanks and aircrafts. The U.S. economy benefited from the war, even though 
the car production was affected. Due to the bad working condition in automobile 
production plants, the United Auto Workers union was formed and strikes happened in 
General Motors Corporation, Chrysler Corporation and Ford Motor Corporation. During 
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this period, some auto makers stopped their production and the big three giants in the U.S. 
automobile industry played important roles. 
After World War II, the car production in the U.S. grew rapidly. New technologies were 
used in car design to meet the market requirement, whatever in styling, plating and others. 
The overhead valve V-8 engine, Hemi engine, Cadillac Eldorado, Imperial appeared in 
the market. After the war, imported cars started to compete with the U.S. domestic auto 
makers. Compact cars were the representation of this competition. Soon after, pony, 
muscle cars and other full size cars were introduced quickly to satisfy diversified 
customer demands.  
In 1970s, more foreign cars entered the U.S. market. Under the high oil price, especially 
during the energy crisis in 1972, almost all automobile companies were hurt gravely. To 
reduce the cost, new models were introduced by the big companies with great effort. 
Chevrolet Vega, Cadillac Cimarron was their representative. Disc brakes, fuel injection, 
electronic engine control units and electronic ignition were also used in car construction.  
In 1980s, Japanese automobiles poured into the U.S. market. Also Japanese car makers 
began to invest their auto production plants in the U.S. Lean production at the same time 
was introduced to the U.S. (Womack, et al., 1990). Operation management and 
technological innovation in automobile industry led to car productivity improvement. 
With the falling-off of the oil price, Chrysler Corporation recovered. The Minivan, K-
cars came out in the market. In 1987, Chrysler purchased American Motors to produce 
the Jeep. Ford came back to leading position in the U.S. automobile industry. In 1985, 
Taurus was the most successful model. The U.S. automobile industry started to revive. 
In the mid-1990s, light truck including Sport utility vehicles, Pickup trucks and Minivan 
was welcome in the U.S. market. Also automobile industry focused on standardizing 
outsourcing, sharing platforms and applying IT technology (Takeishi & Fujimoto, 2001). 
However, Japanese automobile companies still brought strong thread to the U.S. 
automobile industry. Moreover, the U.S. automobile industry heavily depended on gas 
price, due to their large size models. Big Three turned into Big Two because Chrysler 
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was acquired by German auto maker Daimler-Benz. GM and Ford also ran into debts by 
global economy. The U.S. automobile industry began to fall.  
From the early 20th century until now, the U.S. automobile industry has gone through 
more than 100 years. The U.S. auto makers competed with the rivals by continuous 
innovation and development. They catered the customers on car styling and performance 
requirement. The U.S. dominated the world automobile industry for long time. The U.S. 
became the true big and strong country (Coffey, 1998). 
1.1.2 Europe automobile industry 
In the western countries, automobile industry mostly concentrated in the U.S. and Europe. 
Actually Europe automobile industry ran ahead of the U.S. at the beginning. In 1886, 
Benz Karl Friedrich first invented a car. Soon Motor vehicle companies appeared in 
Europe. Earliest companies were Mercedes-Benz, Daimler in German; Peugeot, Renault 
in France; Austin, Rover in UK and Fiat in Italy. Europe was the cradle of the world 
automobile industry. Europe automobile was known for the meticulous work, elegant 
design, and unique fashion. Differently from the U.S. and Japan, Europe automobile 
industry created unique style because each country in Europe had very different 
geographical and culture. Europe automobiles were all showing a tread of diversification. 
Europe automobile industry had occupied the dominant position in the early history of 
world automobile industry. Europe automobile companies mostly produced cars with 
craft production. However, emphasizing on luxury and expensive, Europe limited the 
development of automobile industry.  
After the World War I, French Citroen first introduced Mass production into Europe. In 
1929, GM and Ford brought the factories from UK and German directly and operated 
Mass production in their European companies. This large scale production had spread 
into Europe soon. In 1930, European car manufacturing kept up with the U.S. production, 
which also promoted the development of Europe automobile industry.  
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Europe auto carmakers could not compete production scale and price with the U.S. 
However, Europe auto makers found the U.S. automobile‟s weakness of single model, 
more fuel consumption and higher vulnerability. They used their advantaged technologies 
to develop the colorful products such as front engine, front drive, rear engine, rear drive, 
uni-body, micro-fuel cars, etc. These vehicles can adapt to different road conditions and 
individual requirement. Mercedes-Benz, MMW, Ferrari, Citroen, Jaguar, Beetle, Mini 
had been introduced at this time with their individual features.   
Another important issue for Europe automobile industry was the Union government 
policy of abolishing the national tariff. During the late 50s to early 60s in the twentieth 
century, Europe canceled tariff for every country so that cars from the world could be 
sold free in Europe. Diversification in design became the biggest advantage at that time. 
The auto production surmounted 10 million units per year. In 1973, Europe automobile 
output reached 15 millions. Annual average growth rate was 10.6%. The auto 
manufacturing center changed to Europe from the U.S. 
Since then, due to the two oil crisis, Europe automobile industry went into slow growth 
stage. In 20 years from then on, Europe automobile output has been kept between 15 to 
18 million. This production mostly came from five countries in Western Europe. They 
not only had similar automobile development process, but also had their own 
characteristics: 
Germany (West Germany): Before World War II, Germany automobile industry already 
had a good foundation. Daimler, Benz, Audi, Volkswagen were in a certain scale. 
Although Germany was defeated in World War II, the automobile industry was recovered 
and developed rapidly. In 1950, vehicle output was 300,000. With the popularity of 
domestic cars and increase of competitiveness, Germany auto industry grew significantly. 
During the early 60s, the rates of German vehicle production growth reached 21%. 
German became the largest car producer and exporter in Europe. From 80s in the last 
century, Germany automobile output was 400,000-500,000. 
France: Before World War II, France automobile industry had already been in the top 
level in Europe. After World War II, France rebuilt the automobile industry. National car 
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was getting popular fast. Car exports were also growing. From 80s in the last century, 
French cars‟ annual production was 300,000-800,000. 
United Kingdom: Before World War II, UK had the most powerful automobile industry 
in Europe. In 1938, Austin, Rover and all others produced 450,000 cars. UK automobile 
industry was less damaged in World War II. Its automobile industry got rapid recovery 
after World War II. In 1955, UK automobile industry output was 1,200,000.  
Italy: Before World War II, Italian automobile industry had a certain development. 
Vehicle products were about 50,000. During World War II, this number was down to a 
few thousand. After World War II, Italy rapidly developed its automobile industry. In 
1963, vehicles production reached 1,180,000. 
Spain: After World War II, Spanish economic level was low, automobile industry had not 
been developed well. In 1960, vehicle products were less than 60,000. However, with the 
increase of Spanish economy, automobile market was getting expansion later. Moreover, 
more export and less import pushed Spanish automobile industry forward. In the late 80s, 
Spanish automobile outputs surpassed UK and Italy and became the third one in Europe, 
only after Germany and France. 
When Japanese auto makers came into Europe, Lean production was introduced into. 
However, this “best practice” in manufacturing (Takeishi & Fujimoto, 2001) had not 
brought good results because Japanese models in difference countries had limited success 
(Dankbaar, 1996). 
In the mid-1990s, two German automakers first applied modular production in their 
Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz in Europe (Takeishi & Fujimoto, 2001). Europe 
automakers had more interesting on outsourcing among the modular system. However, 
under the global crisis, R&D for auto parts was facing a severe situation. In order to 
avoid the high production cost in Europe, many Europe automakers moved their factories 
to China, India, Japan and South Korea. In addition, crude oil price raised, raw materials 
prices skyrocketed, which made Europe automobile industry at a big risk. 
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1.1.3 Japan automobile industry 
Japanese automobile industry went through a different way to the U.S. and Europe 
automobile industry. The deficiencies of national resource led to more difficulty in 
developing automobile industry. Government support became the driving force.  
In 1907, Torao Yamaha built the first domestic engine car in his Tokyo Motor Factory. 
From 1914 to 1917, Masujiro Hashimoto with his Kaishinsha Motor assembled British 
cars and sold them in Japan. They also produced Dattogo-Japanese car. Kaishinsha was 
the first automobile manufacturer in Japan. Also in 1914, Mitsubishi Zosen, as the first 
Mass production practitioner in Japan, made 22 car models.  
In this period, a number of car manufacturers appeared in Japan.  Toyota was just one of 
them. At the early time, Toyota was a family business. One of Toyota family - Kiichiro 
visited Ford in 1929. In 1937, Toyota Motor Company was founded. Toyota in this 
period was fully involved in the U.S. Mass production. At the beginning, Toyota 
produced a model by coping Chrysler Airflow, then they imitated Swedish Volvo pv60. 
They firmly believed that imitation was simpler than innovation (Ma, 2010). Several 
years later, imitation happened more often in Japanese automobile industry, such as 
Subaru 360, known as Lady Beetle, which was similar with Volkswagen Beetle in 
Germany. Milliliter Corolla 1000 was just the same as Opel kadett, with little change in 
the body. They insisted on safe, economic and traditional cars instead of innovation 
products. However, the military government tried to produce trucks during the war, 
Toyota‟s passenger cars had to fail. Family management also exposed its shortcoming. In 
addition, Japanese were failed in the World War II, and Japanese automobile industry 
was damaged. By 1950, Toyota Motor Company only produced 2685 automobiles. 
In the early 1950s, the U.S. cars and Europe cars flooded into the Japan market. This 
situation posed a mortal thread to Japanese automobile industry which was in 
reconstruction. At that time, Japanese government wanted to protect its own automobile 
industry, and increased automobile imports tariff up to 40%. Moreover, foreign capital 
was strictly prohibited to seep into Japanese automobile industry. Some small auto 
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makers had to collaborate with foreign manufacturers. Only Toyota developed domestic 
cars by their own production.  
In the spring of 1950, Eiji Toyota invested in Ford‟s Rouge plant in Detroit who could 
produce 7000 automobiles per day. After he was back to Japan, Eiji Toyota and Taiichi 
Ohno compared local automobile production with the U.S. Mass production, and found 
that Mass production needed to be changed in Japan because Japan has small market and 
small quantities with many varieties. Also lack of cheap labors made that simply copy 
could not improve their production system. Lean production emphasized on reducing cost 
and eliminating the waste by the workers‟ effort. In Wikipedia, this production was 
defined as  
“A production practice that considers the expenditure of resources for any goal other than 
the creation of value for the end customer to be wasteful, and thus a target for elimination. 
Working from the perspective of the customer who consumes a product or service, „value‟ 
is defined as any action or process that a customer would be willing to pay for.” 
This new management method brought revolutionary change to automobile industry. In 
1961-1971, Toyota was in its great development time. Automobile output improved from 
200,000 units in 1961 to 2,000,000 units 1971. In this period, Japanese auto makers 
launched many new models: Kei car, Subaru 360, Suzuki Fronte, Mitsubishi 500, Mazda 
carol and Honda N360. 
In this period, government introduced some policies again to develop the economic cars. 
In 1955, Ministry of International Trade and Industry - MITI announced policies to 
encourage the development of the national car and provided business loans and tax 
incentives, so that automakers could get adequate funding for their innovation. In 1965, 
first highway in Japan from Nagoya to Kobe opened. In 1966, Japanese cars came into 
the family. Since then, the Japanese cars set off an explosive wave to population.   
From 1970, with the increasing domestic demand and joining the foreign markets, 
Japanese automobile production continued to improve in a fast speed. With Lean 
production, Toyota not only went though oil crisis smoothly in 1973, but also obtained 
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the high profits than other companies. Lean production was then popularized. In 1980, 
Japanese automobile output reached up to 11 million. Under the leadership of Toyota, 
Japanese automobile production surpassed the U.S., Europe and became the biggest and 
the most successful one in the world.  
At the early 90s, Toyota corolla, Lexus got success in oversea market at the same time. It 
was the first Asian brand in North American and UK. Celica, Land Cruiser, Hi Lux, etc. 
obtained success also. Honda Accord, Nissan, Acura, Infiniti, Scion, and so on occupy 
the most car market. Japanese car manufacturers insisted on affordable, credible and 
modish cars and became the top automobile producing nation. 
By building new factories in the U.S. and Europe, modular production was introduced 
into Japan automobile industry. However, Japanese automakers took different paths in 
the application of modular production, because this new method was implemented with 
different ways by different regions and companies (Takeishi & Fujimoto, 2001). With the 
essence of Lean production, Japanese more focused on modularization in in-house 
production. They more emphasized on redesigning the modules. With this improvement, 
Japanese automobile design capability reached the top level in the world in recent years.  
Today, Japanese automobile manufacturing mostly concentrates in Toyota, Honda, 
Daihatsu, Nissan, Suzuki, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Subaru, Isuzu, Kawasaki, Yamaha and 
Mitsuoka. They take innovation to support Japanese automobile industry. However, 
market share has changed since 2000. New competitor from South Korea, China and 
India bring thread to Japanese automobile industry. Moreover, the U.S. and Europe 
automakers have been revived through mergers and acquisitions. Now, GM has 20% 
shares in Fuji, 49% shares in Isuzu and 9.9% shares in Suzuki; Ford holds a 33.4% share 
in Mazda; Daimler-Chrysler has a 34% share in Mitsubishi. Japanese automobile industry 
is going to be decadent.  
Auto production in different countries during different periods is shown in Figures 2-4. 
These figures illustrated that world automobile manufacturing center is always changing: 
the automobile industry first began in Europe and then transferred to North American, 
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then back to Europe again. Now, Japan and Asia are gradually dominating this industry 
and leading it forward (shown in Figure 5). 
 
Figure 1.2 1900-1940 vehicle output in the U.S., Japan and five countries in Europe. 
(Source from the World Automobile Manufacturers Association) 
 
Figure 1.3 1946-1987 vehicle output in the U.S., Japan and five countries in Europe. 
(Source from the World Automobile Manufacturers Association) 
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Figure 1.4 1997-2009 vehicle output in the U.S., Japan and five countries in Europe. 
(Source from the World Automobile Manufacturers Association) 
 
 
 
                                                         
                                                                                  
                                                                                                          
                                                                                                               
 
Figure 1.5 Transition diagram of global automobile industry 
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1.1.4 Korea automobile industry  
Korea automobile industry started from the mid 1950s. At that time, the Korean War had 
just ended and national economy was just recovered. Automobile demand was urgent. 
This real need became a major reason for the development of automobile industry. 
In 1955, Choi Mu-seong produced the first car by refitting an Army Jeep. He named 
Sibal to mean a new start. In this period, Korean automobile industry is mostly repairing 
or refitting old vehicles. In 1960, Sinjin Automobile introduced Sinjin Publica with 
Toyota‟s help. In 1962, Korea auto production was less than 2000 units. To develop the 
national automobile industry, Korean government promulgated “Automobile Industry 
Promotion Policy”. Also “Automobile Industry Protection Act” helped Korea‟s puny 
automobile industry grow rapidly. Foreign auto companies could only cooperate with 
Korean companies; otherwise they couldn‟t manufacture cars in Korea. New joint venture 
companies appeared in Korea, including Kia Industry with Mazda in 1964; Saenara 
Automobile with Nissan; Hyundai Motor Company with Ford. This joint venture 
companies only assembled imported parts from their overseas partners. At this time, 
Korean automobile industry was based on KD assembly.   
In 1969, Korea government proposed “Basic plan for the development of automobile 
industry”. In this plan, government put forward that automobile industry must achieve 
localization. In 1973, Korean President issued “Declaration of heavy chemical 
industrialization”. Automobile industry was included in the ten industries in Korea, and 
government gave priority and support.  
In order to promote the great development of automobile industry in Korea, some small 
automakers were stopped or merged. From then on, Hyundai, Kia, Asia and GM Korea 
were formed to establish the production system. In this period, Korean automobile 
industry took effort to develop national cars, design their own vehicles and introduce new 
models. In 1973, Kia industry developed the first 2000cc car engine. In 1974, Hyundai 
Motor Clubs created Pony car. Korea started to product cars independently. 
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In 1976, Hyundai was exported to Ecuador in Latin American; Kia and GM Korea trucks 
were exported to the Middle East. Korean automobile hence entered the international 
market. In 1979, Korea government announced officially that automobile was one of the 
exporting commodities. Korea auto production exceeded 200,000 units, with exports over 
30,000 units. 
From the late 70s to early 80s, Korea economy was a negative growth. The government 
revitalized the automobile industry into the international market. In 1981, 
“Rationalization Measure for Automobile Industry” focused on implementing specialized 
production and enhancing competitiveness by joint venture or combination. Government 
clearly prescribed that Kia and East Asia concentrate on fire engines and 5 tons Vans; 
Asia Auto Clubs focused on Jeeps and so on. To create a competitive system, more than 5 
tons of trucks and buses were allowed to be freely produced by other auto clubs. Since 
1982, with the recovering of Korean‟ economy, vehicle production had increased rapidly. 
By 1983, Korean production reached more than 220,000 vehicles. In 1985, it was 
378,000. 
After the mid-80s, Korean government proposed new goal which further expanded the 
production scale, speeded up technology development, increased exports so that Korea 
could become big auto production and export country. To achieve this goal, Korean 
government opened the auto market from 1987. Meanwhile, automobile manufacturing 
was no longer restricted on vehicles or cars, which promoted the development of 
automobile industry in Korea to a higher level.  
In this situation, Korean automobile companies were scrambling to develop new types, 
new models, and adopted various measures: Hyundai began to produce more advanced 
Pawnee Sedans; Daewoo started to develop Leemans; Kia introduced Bei Sita Sedans and 
so on. At the same time, various auto clubs competed to enter the international market 
including Latin American, Southeast Asia, North American, and finally European market. 
Also Korean automobiles were squeezed into Japanese market. Now the Korean cars 
have been exported to more than 190 counties and regions. 
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Throughout the history of automobile industry in the world, it‟s clear that western 
countries had strong economy before starting their automobile industry. Advanced 
technologies in other industry were used in the automobile industry. New management 
and new innovation stimulated the auto invention and the development. However, in 
Asian countries, economic base was very weak. To catch up with the developed countries, 
imitation was the first choice to fast develop automobile industry, and then followed by 
their second innovation (Schaik & Van de Klundert, 2010). It is also a wise choice at the 
beginning for many other developing countries. Today China is taking the same path with 
Japan and Korea and has achieved a surprising progress. 
1.2 The history of Chinese automobile industry 
There are always some arguments about the development of Chinese automobile industry, 
even with the division of the development periods. However, in this study, the history 
will be mostly focused on the recent 60 years, after the end of the civil war in 1949. 
Before this, China was always in troubled time for more than a century, while western 
countries were developing their industries much faster.  Chinese automobile industry is 
then divided into three periods according to this consideration: first, independent 
manufacturing period; second, Joint Venture period; third, innovation with imitation 
period. These three periods clearly mark the development of Chinese automobile industry 
from 1950s to 2010s. 
1.2.1 Independent manufacturing 
The first period was from 1953 to 1978. Chinese automobile industry started by learning 
from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). But soon it had to develop this 
industry all by themselves after Chinese government argued and fought with USSR 
government. This period was also called “truck industry time”, as the major products 
were trucks. However, Chinese automobile industry had been constrained during this 
period because of various historical reasons. In addition, technology, capital, talent, and 
many other factors bottlenecked the development of Chinese automobile industry. 
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The First Auto Factory was built in Changchun in 1953 with the assistance of USSR‟s 
experts, when Chairman Mao decided to establish automobile industry in China. All 
technology was from USSR.  Its first product was named Jiefang, which means 
„liberation‟ in Chinese. That was a four-ton CA10 truck which originated from Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan. All parts were produced in China, while technology of construction and 
production was completely copied.  Soon the political environment changed, and the First 
Auto Factory had to innovate the technology themselves. They developed CA30 and 
CA30A off-road vehicles. These two trucks were the first imitated products which 
specially produced for armed forces. From then on, imitation to production began to 
expand: in 1957, Nanjing Auto Factory produced NJ130 light truck by coping Soviet 
GAZ51; in 1958, Shanghai Auto Factory trialed the first car which was a simulation of 
Poland Warsaw chassis and Chrysler Plymouth styles; in the same year, Beijing Auto 
Factory produced a sample car by imitating Germany Volkswagen Beetle. During these 
imitations, innovation was also adopted (Schnaars, 1994; Shankar, Carpenter, & 
Krishnamurthi 1998). Self-owned brands autos such as Dongfen, Hongqi, Shanghai, 
fenghuan, Jinggangshan were created. Chinese Government also invested a large amount 
of money in automobile industry.  Many factories could develop their own brands 
independently. 
However, government system and policy limited the development of Chinese auto 
industry in this period (W. Li, 1997). Planned economy curbed the innovative ability; 
decade of Great Culture Revolution interrupted the progress of Chinese industry. In 
nearly 30 years, Chinese car output only broke through 5,000 units. The production of 
cars is shown in Figure 6. 
During this period, Mass production had already been used in the U.S. and spread to 
Europe and Japan. However, the technology source of Chinese automobile industry was 
USSR, and Mass production technology was not adopted because of various reasons. 
Another important issue was that China was lack of marketing mechanisms and factories 
were built by the central or local government, which resulted in tough difficulty for the 
development of Mass production. Hence Chinese automobile industry had large gap with 
the U.S. and Europe at that time. 
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Figure 1.6 1953-1982 vehicle and car production in China 
1.2.2 Joint venture companies 
Xiaoping Deng was in power after 1978, and a new era was started. As a general policy, 
reform and open became the very popular terms in China. Joint venture companies were 
introduced into China, and the second period of Chinese automobile industry began. 
Chinese government made much effort to encourage foreign (mostly western) capital and 
technology to come into China, with a promise of exchanging with Chinese market. The 
market – technology theory by Chinese government thought that this practice could 
quickly improve the auto productivity and the industry, and was a win-win strategy (Y. 
Zhao, 2002).  
At the beginning, Chinese market was just opened, and the amount of imported cars 
exceeded the nationally-made cars (shown in Table 1). Cars were imported from 
everywhere in the world, from the U.S., Japan, west Europe, East Europe, India, etc. 
Some policies were quickly enacted to encourage foreign companies to cooperate with 
Chinese factories with special approval by the central government (L. Li, 2008).  
As some researchers concluded, technological improvement in a developing country is 
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diffusion. That was true in China, and the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) had become 
an important channel for international technology diffusion (Eaton & Kortum, 1999). 
Some joint venture companies such as Shanghai Volkswagen, Guangzhou Peugeot, and 
Chongqing Suzuki brought their technologies and capitals to China, which greatly pushed 
Chinese automobile industry forward. 
Table 1 The imported cars in China between 1981-1985 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Car imports 1401 1101 5806 21651 105775 
Car imports over domestic 
total output (%) 
40.87 27.32 96.03 360.25 2031.4 
The first joint venture was between Beijing Auto Factory and the American Motor 
Corporation (AMC). Another important joint venture company was Shanghai 
Volkswagen. In 1983, Shanghai Auto Factory bought a knock-down kit (KD) assembly 
line from German Volkswagen to produce Santana. 
In developing countries, usually KD was a popular practice at the beginning of 
automobile industry: KD brought the engine, body, chassis, gearbox and other 
manufacturing technologies to Japan; it also formed the production capacity with basic 
components in Korea (Chu, 1997). It was explained in encyclopedia as: 
“A knock-down kit which is a kit containing the parts needed to assemble a product. The 
parts are manufactured in one country or region, and then exported to another country or 
region for final assembly. CKD (Completely Knock Down), SKD (Semi Knock Down) 
and DKD (Direct Knocked Down) are a complete, incomplete and direct kit needed to 
assemble a product. This is also a method of supplying parts to a market.” 
KD and CKD methods made Shanghai Volkswagens more profitable, especially after 
some parts were manufactured locally.  As a successful model in China, Shanghai 
Volkswagen vigorously promotes in a short time.  
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The success of Shanghai Volkswagen attracted more foreign companies to find Chinese 
partners. Although there was a well-known policy for foreign companies which limited 
their shareholding for less than 50%, more and more FDI came into Chinese market. 
Guangzhou Peugeot, Nanjing IEVCO, Yiqi Audi and Erqi Citroen were produced in 
China. This pattern greatly achieved the government‟s goal “High starting point, high 
volume and specialization”. As the key production method, CKD, SKD, even DKD 
played important roles in joint venture companies. In 1997, only after 15 years 
development, Chinese automobile output exceeded 330,000 (CATRC, 1997). In contrast, 
those previous state-owned auto companies all gave up their own brands.  KD hence 
became a restriction to the national auto development capacity (Qu, 1994).  Chinese also 
paid for the success of joint venture policy – their own innovation ability was lost. 
In the second period of Chinese automobile industry, joint venture companies practiced 
different management skills. Guangzhou Peugeot was a typical negative example (Thun, 
2004): in 1985, Guangzhou Automobile Group cooperated with France Peugeot 
Company. There were arguments about car models‟ updating and technology 
introduction. Moreover, Guangzhou local government made too much constrains for the 
project. Guangzhou Peugeot started to lose money from 1994. This Joint Venture 
company announced failure in 1997 (Office, 1993) (Center & Association, 2009). 
It is worth of mention that Lean production was introduced into China during this period. 
All essence in Lean production such as zero defects, zero inventory, JIT, Kanban, QCM, 
etc. were used in enterprise management. However, Lean production in Chinese 
automobile companies was still not a successful method today.  Most Chinese carmakers 
reported a psychological dependence on CKD (Lin, Cai, & Li, 2002). Another issue was 
that in this period, Chinese automobile industry could only purchases technology that 
combined with the parts; there was no space for them to develop their own technology. 
Losing the power of innovation was so clear that Lean production started with doom then 
fall into failure finally. 
During this period, by KD assembly auto parts, Chinese automobile industry had been 
able to survive and develop fast based on the support of Chinese government, with 
23 
 
special policies in tariff, import and enterprise access conditions. In addition, foreign 
automobile partners learnt to adapt to Chinese policies so that FDI could get more profits 
in China (Lai & Bao, 2003). China improved its production capability with FDI‟s help 
(Qiu, Yang, Xin, & Kirkulak, 2009) (Liu & Zhao, 2006). In the meanwhile, some 
Chinese researchers hold a negative point of view on FDI (Wang & Zhu, 2008). They 
thought that joint venture companies could not bring the competent ability to Chinese 
automobile industry; the core technologies were still mastered by the foreigners.  Under 
the nationalism waves, Chinese automobile industry had to start their independent 
innovation. From then, the third period of Chinese automobile industry began. 
1.2.3 Imitation and innovation 
From 1997, China speeded up the process of joining WTO. FDI then had less limitation 
to enter Chinese market. More automobile companies poured into China. Advanced 
technology and management method were brought into Chinese automobile industry. 
New joint venture companies developed faster to catch up or even exceed the old ones. In 
addition, green supply chain (Zhu, Sarkis, & Lai, 2007) improved environment protection 
and operation performance. Shanghai GM was a good example in this aspect. 
Shanghai GM was built in 1997. It was derived from Shanghai Automobile Industry INC. 
and US GM.  It was the first one to realize flexible production line in auto manufacture in 
China.  In 2010, they produced 103 million cars; surpassed Shanghai Volkswagen‟s 100 
million. Shanghai GM also directly used the most advanced car production lines and 
equipments. Their flexible production line not only produced multiple models, but also 
met the diverse needs of the market including the sales, service and parts required by 
customers. Modular strategy was also applied in all the process including manufacture, 
design, supply chain, and even in service. 
Other new joint venture companies such as Guangzhou Honda, Beijing Hyundai, Tianjin 
Toyota, etc. cooperated with Chinese state-owned auto factories and realize great leaps. 
A more important issue was that these new members evaluated the development paths of 
old ones including how to manage the enterprise and deal with government (Thun, 2004). 
By drawing their experience and learning the lessons, they played a positive role in 
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Chinese automobile industry and developed even faster. Modular production became one 
of the very important methods that could be accepted by most automobile companies. 
With the development of Chinese economy and improvement of living levels, the 
demand of automobile products for Chinese consumers tended to be more individualized. 
As a concept, modular was proposed in the application of arranging modules with 
variability and scalability. With this method, the flexibility of the whole system was 
increased and could adapt to different demands from the customers (Baldwin & Clark, 
1997). Modular was soon used in automobile industry. The definition for modular by 
Automobile Original Equipment Manufacturer-AOEMs (Pandremenos, Paralikas, 
Salonitis , & Chryssolouris, 2009) is: 
“A group of components, physically close to each other that are both assembled and 
tested outside the facilities and can be assembled very simply onto car.” 
Modular is a complex system (Starr, 1965). When modular was used in manufacturing, 
Modular production was proposed.  Actually, Modular production has no precise 
definition. This production method also is a production system. This new system is based 
on new product-oriented manufacturing method from standardized machine elements.  
Hardware and software are early connecting with makers and suppliers. The overall goal 
is to provide rapidly design and configure for customer individualized products (Tsukune 
et al., 1993). 
In automobile industry, modular can be executed in three fields, including Modular in 
Design (MID), Modular in Use (MIU) and Modular in Production (MIP) (Pandremenos, 
et al., 2009). Among them, MIP is used more frequently in automobile industry than 
others (Graziadio, 2003). Modular production in car assembly gets more benefit in 
improving productivity (Van Hoek & Weken, 1998).  Outsourcing is another important 
part of modular. Increasing outsourcing, shifting territories, and moving towards modular 
supply (Collins, Bechler, & Pires, 1997) becomes very important competent advantages 
in new era. In China, there are lots of researchers focusing on the study of flexibility in 
MIP (Bao, Zhou, & Zhu, 2005) (J. Zhao, 2006) and Supply Chain (Dai, Gao, & Xiao, 
2009) (Zhu, et al., 2007).  MIU is considered as a method that can match customers‟ need 
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by configuring the equipment (Graziadio, 2003). This is also highlighted in Shanghai 
Volkswagen and Shanghai GM. Each customer can choose their own favorite car online, 
and they can also make their own personalization, such as configuration, color, and place 
where they want to pick up the car. Moreover, the order from internet will be formed 
automatically as a product instruction by the system, then come into the flexible 
production line. At last, under the control of this system, this personalized car booked 
from internet will be delivered to customers on time. Another highlight is that customer 
can check the situation of their car in this system: whatever is happening in the 
production line, in painting, or on the way of delivery. This new method is being used 
gradually in all the Chinese automobile industry.  
The history of the first and second period of Chinese automobile industry already proved 
that Chinese automobile industry could not be developed without innovation. In the 
process of introducing Modular production, imitation to innovation had been carried out. 
MID realized the old and newly developed platform (Sugiyama & Fujimoto, 2000) for 
producing different models. In addition, MID itself had been improved. Modularity-based 
technology innovation (MBTI) (Gu & Xu, 2006) provided a theoretical basis for Chinese 
technology imitation. In the process of pursuing new technologies, as an important 
approach, imitation was applied in China. Actually, all Chinese self-owned brands 
automobile companies such as Chery, Geely, Jinlong, Yutong, BYD, etc. adapted 
imitation to realize innovation when they grew up. These companies are now in a phase 
of innovation with creation. This transition had been particularly studied (Dolson & 
Safarian, 2008). Hence the third period of Chinese automobile industry began. 
Imitation is not a new concept in learning technology. Some researchers studied the 
difference between innovation and imitation and  compared experience in different 
developed countries (Boyer, Charron, Jürgens, & Tolliday, 1998) (Yi, 2011).  Imitation 
becomes a feasible method that can be applied in different demands. Aerospace industry 
in China (Chen, 2009) is a very successful example in technology imitation.  The 
development of Japanese industry also took the same way (Bolton, 1993). Korean 
automobile industry more benefited from imitation (L. Kim, 1997). Today Chinese 
automobile industry is achieving remarkable improvement. However, imitation can only 
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catch up with others fast, but cannot be useful for surpassing them. Simple imitation is 
helpful for starting, but it is harmful for developing (Ma, 2010). Hence, imitation has to 
be stepped into innovation in China. 
Under the global competence, reducing cost is always the final goal for manufacturers, 
although different period has different competence advantages (Davis, Heineke, & 
Balakrishnan, 2007). In the 21th century, product‟s short life cycle makes more new 
products being replaced shortly. Because development of new products does not depend 
on technology itself, but comes from the market (C. Kim & Fujimoto, 1991). So in 
today‟s market, product‟s fast change can be rapidly responded to market demands (Sun, 
2002). In automobile industry, companies also can develop new products and markets 
with the imitation strategy (Zhou, 2006). Because old products can provide the 
information for new ones (Schnaars, 1994), the cost for imitation is much lower than 
innovation (Zhou, 2006). Even, imitators can fast catch up with innovators by copying 
old products to get progress (Kerin, Varadarajan, & Peterson, 1992), or purchasing 
common technologies (Chen, 2009). So imitation to innovation is a smart decision for 
enterprise that enters the market latterly (Zhou, 2006). In China, imitation is the only way 
to develop Chinese automobile industry in some degree (Guo, 2009). 
In the third period all Chinese auto companies are focusing on imitation to innovation.  
This kind of method makes Chinese automobile industry realize surprising development. 
The output of Chinese automobile in this period is almost a vertical rise (Figure 7). 
Moreover, their market share improves year by year. In 2009, Chinese own brands cars 
already occupied 44% of the Chinese auto market (Figure 8).  
In today‟ China, producing self-owned brand cars in joint venture companies is becoming 
a new tendency.  LAVIDA, NEEZA from Shanghai Volkswagen; SGMW from Shanghai 
SM; EVERUS from Guangzhou Honda, etc. raised a new wave between independent and 
joint venture companies. 
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Figure 1.7 Vehicle output of China in 1953-2009 
(Source from (Center & Association, 2009)) 
 
 
Figure 1.8 Market shares of national brands passenger cars in China 
(Source from (Center & Association, 2009)) 
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In Chinese self-owned brand companies, BYD is a miracle.  In short 8 years, BYD 
became the top one of private carmakers from a cell phone battery manufacturer. 
Imitating technology helped them realize fast development and took fewer detours. 
Modular production in BYD was also being used in all production operation. They 
wanted to master more car parts production so that car parts could be highly concentrated 
for supporting. Modular production was more practice in enterprise management. Merger, 
reorganization and expansion became their development goal.   
Moreover, BYD grasped the electric car and became one of the leading manufacturers in 
the world. This new development direction attracted more attention. In September 2010, 
Warren Buffett visited BYD and made his strategic investment. Today, Chinese 
automobile production has occupied a certain position in the world.  
Concluding the Chinese automobile industry, the government restricted the mass 
production system in the first period. Technology introducing hindered Lean production 
in the second period. Modular production, however, greatly accelerated the development 
of Chinese auto industry, although modular production first adapted in developed 
countries. Imitation to innovation was the main method for improving the competent 
ability, in the third period. Moreover, some important policies also encouraged and 
pushed Chinese automobile industry. In today‟s China, Green Strategies is going across 
the whole country. Chinese automobile industry with green future plan is expected to 
play an important role in the world soon. 
Today, China pays more attention to the world whatever its manufacturing market or 
customer market. Almost all famous automakers in the world have built factories in 
China. Chinese own car makers are developing very fast also. Until 2010, China has 
more than 120 vehicles manufacturing factories including 33 cars manufacturing factories. 
China becomes the largest automobile producer in the world.  
1.3 Chinese automobile industry map 
Chinese automobile industry started from planned economy but finalized in market 
economy. Along with its fast development, automobile companies formed large but 
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uniform production sections by mergers and acquisitions. Now automobile industry in 
China concentrates in five sections (Dong, 2006). Its map is shown in Figure 9 (white 
areas). 
 
Figure 1.9 China vehicle manufacturing map 
First section - Northeast China: FAW in Changchun is a representative company. It is the 
first carmaker in China. With government support, solid industrial base and strong 
industrial heritage, FAW is considered as the first-class automobile company in China. 
Currently, the Northeast China has formed the leading professional automobile section, 
including FAW Volkswagen, Shenyang Jinbei GM, Brilliance BMW, Harbin Motor and 
other companies. In these companies, particularly FAW-Volkswagen and Brilliance 
BMW are the most eye-catching ones. 
Second section - East China: By virtue of location advantages in the Yangtze River Delta 
and excellent development models, automobile industry in East China catches and 
exceeds the Northeast section. As a latecomer, East China soon becomes second-class 
market in China. The typical automobile company in East China is Shanghai Volkswagen, 
Shanghai GM, and Anhui Chery. Chery is one of Chinese owned brands. Its development 
model is also a unique style, just as any other self-owned brand automobile company. 
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Automobile industry in East China has strong professional base. This section has a solid 
and professional foundation so that they can bring specific technical advantage to the 
powerful products and marketing management.   
Third section - Central China: Wuhan is a leading city in central China. With the help of 
FAW, Dongfeng Motor developed rapidly. Based on the large scale joint venture, much 
more capital and broad influence, Dongfeng Motor becomes the biggest joint venture 
company in China. This raises the central region to a significant level. With the new 
change in China, the development of automobile industry in central China has 
encountered some problems. However, Dongfeng Motor still has the strong potential for 
further development. Automobile industry in central China will be able to achieve a new 
leap. 
Fourth section - Southwest China: Chongqing is the key automobile production base in 
southwest China. Chongqing Changan Suzuki and Chongqing Changan Ford make 
southwest China an important section in Chinese automobile industry market. 
Fifth section - Southern China: Guangdong and Fujian in southern China are typical 
representative regions. This region is also a latecomer. However, regional advantage such 
as the smooth flow of information, geographical location and strong talent pool pushed 
southern China to a high level. In Guangdong, there are Guangzhou Honda and 
Guangzhou Toyota. In Fujian, there are Southeast Lingshuai and other famous enterprises. 
BYD Company is located in this area. Southern China has formed a typical automobile 
industrial chain. The advantage of the chain contributes to the development of automobile 
industry in this section. 
1.4 Chinese government policies 
In the development of automobile industry, the government always plays an important 
role. Particularly in China where the economic system is so exclusive, the government 
role is very unique and much important, where many policies and regulations are 
announced from time to time. These policies and regulations are the most powerful 
supports to the rapidly developed Chinese automobile industry. In the 60 years, policies 
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and regulations kept changing and formed a track for Chinese automobile industry, and 
led Chinese automobile production from 0 to 14 million in short 60 years.  
In the first period of Chinese automobile industry, the government‟s task in automobile 
industry was automobile producing and personal training.  However, national strength 
was not strong; the development speed was much slow. In particular, a decade of Cultural 
Revolution caused automobile industry stagnant or even declined. Under the planned 
economy, auto products were considered as production materials, and the relevant state 
departments had the right to allocate the production to anywhere according to planning 
and proportional principles.  
After China reformed and opened from 1978, Chinese economic system gradually turned 
from planned economy into market economy. A series of new policies were introduced: 
In June 1980, National Machinery Industry Commission issued a “1981 to 1990 National 
Motor Vehicle Development Program” (Trial) and “Auto industry restructuring program 
adjustment” (Trial). These two policies made some key automobile enterprises such as 
First Auto Company; Dongfeng Auto Company started their combination. Many small 
factories were integrated into them or built around them, so that big auto companies 
could expand their production scale and reduce repetitive production.   
In addition, Chinese Automobile Industry Corporation was also established and a unified 
economic entity was formed to operate national automobile industry, including Jiefang, 
Dongfeng, Beijing, Tianjing, Hebei, Nanjing, Chinese Heavy-duty Automobile Industry 
Associates, Shanghai automobile tractors and Auto Parts Industry Associates. 
In April 1986, automobile industry was mentioned as a pillar industry in Seventh Five-
year Plan. In October 31, 1987, “The State Council further notice about strict control of 
imported cars” clearly announced that the State Council was no longer involved in the 
new car production. This policy effectively prevented herd of too much carmakers, and 
avoided huge loss, to promote the healthy development of Chinese automobile industry. 
In 1991, a policy about automobile industry was approved in Eighth Five-year Plan. It 
emphasized that automobile industry played an important role in the national economy; it 
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was not just a tool to meet the transportation needs. During 1980-1990, the central 
government implemented much more methods including decentralization, separating, and 
external cooperation. The introduction of technological policy also pushed Chinese 
automobile industry. Also in the mid-90s in the last century, China thoroughly completed 
the transition from planned economy to market economy. 
In July 1994, „Automobile industry policy” was carrying out. This was the first Chinese 
automobile industry regulations by Chinese government. This regulation set out policy 
objectives and development priorities, product certification and industrial organization, 
industrial technology, investment and financing, foreign investment, import management, 
export management, and other domestic policies, industrial planning and project 
management. All of them gave guidance to Chinese automobile industry. Particularly in 
Chapter VI, the government for the first time clearly stated that it encouraged automobile 
enterprises to use foreign capital to develop Chinese automobile industry. This policy 
also led to the introduction of joint venture companies. In this automobile industry policy, 
the government also encouraged individuals to buy cars, and encouraged automobile 
companies establish their own sales system and after-sales service system in accordance 
with international principles and models. These provided more protection and power for 
individuals and enterprises.  
In September 1995, Ninth Five-year plan proposed that automobile industry must focus 
on developing auto parts, economic cars and heavy vehicles by establishing a domestic 
technology development system. 
In August 1996, General office of the State Planning Commission announced a notice to 
abolish the restrictions for economic cars. At the same time, the State Council 
promulgated that economical cars were the focal point in Chinese automobile industry, 
especially the small compact cars which had the features of low fuel consumption, small 
parking area and lower price so that they could be accepted by low income population at 
that time. Those policies greatly pushed the production and development of small cars 
market. 
33 
 
In August 1997, the Ministry of Internal Trade in China issued the car rental policy, 
which defined car rental method: the less provided services including automobile 
functions, taxes, and insurance, maintenance and parts services. This method let to the 
establishment of the first car rental company. Six carmakers were involved: FAW, 
Dongfeng, SAIC, Heavy Truck, Tianjing and Jinbei, as well as 17 distribution companies. 
At the same year, the network for national Taxi rental cars was set up in Beijing. 
In the late-90s, automobile industry had become the star of Chinese industry. At that time, 
Chinese Automobile products already covered trucks, buses, cars, sport vehicles and 
other models from a single medium-sized truck. 
In October 2000, Tenth Five-year plan was put forward to encourage the families to buy 
cars. From then on, Chinese huge automobile market was opened.  
Until that time, Chinese automobile industry got the ability to develop fast. However, 
with the proposal of global environment protection, government policies turned to 
respond to this proposal recently. A series of policies enacted soon. 
In January 10, 2001, China government introduced “Air Pollution Prevention Law”. 
Atmospheric pollutants must not exceed the prescribed discharge standards; this 
regulation also gave the specification for the vehicles emission standards. 
Just one year after, General Customs Administration promulgated the notice to adjust the 
provisional tax rates. 
To follow WTO commitments, from January 1, 2002, the government lowered car import 
tariffs for seven times. The tariffs on imported cars changed from 120% to 25%. This 
prompted the car import gradually.  
In June 1, 2004, the National Development and Reform Commission promulgated 
“Automobile Industry Development Policy”. This policy guided automobile companies to 
merger and reorganize.  
34 
 
In October 1, 2004, defective auto recall regulations were implanted. This was the formal 
recall policy which was pioneered by Mitsubishi officially recall on February 14, 2001. 
In April 1, 2005, Administration of Automobile Brands announced that automobile 
suppliers or their authorized distributors must use a unified store name, logo, and 
trademark to run automobile business. This policy clearly directed the trend of brand 
sales in the future. 
In October 2005, Eleventh Five-year Plan was issued to encourage the production and use 
of energy-saving cars. In the following years, many new policies were again enacted 
which included new energy vehicles production, administration of auto financing 
companies, auto emission standards, new adjustment for consumption tax, reducing of the 
price for refined oil, etc. All these policies encouraged energy-saving automobile 
production and sales.  
For protection of the environment, Chinese government also increased funding to support 
the updating of the cars, raised the subsidy levels and enlarged the scope of subsidies so 
that automobiles could be replaced fast. Also, Chinese government gave the necessary 
support to upgrade and improve the technological levels of recovery cars. All of these 
strongly pulled Chinese energy-saving cars‟ production and sales. 
China automobile industry has gone through 60 years. Under the government‟s strong 
support, this industry keeps moving forward fast. Modular production helps auto 
production achieved great progress. Imitation speeds up the continuous updating of the 
products. Huge and growing domestic market and cheap labor are also the great 
advantages in the future. This industry in China will undoubtedly create new surprise to 
the world. 
1.5 Outcome of the literature review 
The history of the automobile industry is a history of management methods improvement. 
Each new method brought up a new overlord in the world. Europe was the origin of the 
automobiles with Craft manufacturing; the U.S. dominated this industry for more than 
half centuries by Mass production. Japan surpassed the U.S. and became the biggest 
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automaker in 1980s with a secret weapon of Lean production.  In 2009, China stood on 
the top of this industry and became the largest auto producer. What brought up China 
again became the focus of the research in this field. 
Chinese automobile industry experienced three development periods in 60 years. 
Socialism economy background led to special characteristics in different periods, more or 
less. However, the updated research of the automobile industry in this large emerging 
economy body is still not abundant. Some major and imperative research topics are still 
missing in literature, e.g., how the Lean production is practiced; if the Modular 
production is successful; if there is any new production method in China. The lack of 
these studies apparently hinders the understanding of the automobile industry in China, as 
well as this giant economy itself, especially for researchers outside of China. 
Some of the above research topics are explored in this study. Four automobile companies 
are selected to represent different aspects of the automobile industry in China. The 
application of Lean production, Modular production, Imitation is investigated. Similar 
methodologies which were used by Womack are conducted here. All the collected data is 
analyzed and compared to those from Womack‟s study. However, the sample of four auto 
companies is too small to cover the entire Chinese automobile industry, although they can 
reflect most aspects of the general situation today. Further research with large samples is 
recommended in the future.  
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CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY 
This study is focuses on Chinese automobile industry, specially the adoption and 
improvement of modern management methods. Mass production, Lean production, 
Modular production are investigated and compared. Case study is applied to find 
connections between Chinese companies with their oversea counterparts (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Four companies are selected to represent Chinese automobile industry: Shanghai 
Volkswagen, Shanghai GM, Chongqing Changan Suzuki, and BYD Auto Company. The 
first three are joint venture companies, and the last one is a private company. Four cases 
can reflect the real situation of this industry in China. 
2.1 Research methods 
Womack and his term investigated 90 assembly plants in 150 countries, they compared 
Japanese automakers with the U.S. and Europe companies through five elements of Lean 
production: running the factory, coordinating the supply chain, dealing with customers, 
designing the car, and managing the lean enterprise (Womack, et al., 1990).  In this study, 
however, only the first three will be investigated: the designing ability in Chinese 
automobile industry is still poor; and lean enterprise has not been well practiced, as they 
haven‟t developed much oversea market.  
Currently used management methods in China are displayed and compared with the U.S. 
and Japanese companies in 1989. Although this comparison is not quite fair, the data can 
at least show at which level Chinese automobile industry is today. 
Modular production was founded to be an important method in China. Outsourcing of 
supply chain was investigated in detail as a representative of this method. Some new 
management methods were introduced. Data from the above four companies are collected 
and analyzed. Imitation also emerged in Chinese automobile industry and will be 
discussed in this study. 
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2.2 Questionnaire development 
For the technology sensitivity, the data used in this study mainly consists of questionnaire 
responses from employees in the four companies. The answers majorly came from three 
sections of the four companies: a) Assembly shop b) Department of procurement c) 
Department of sales. Seventeen items in assembly plant, ten items in the department of 
procurement, and three items in the department of sales were investigated. However, the 
questionnaire does not cover all the questions for different years and different 
management methods.  
For the measurement units in some questions, we provide a brief conversion and 
explanation at the beginning of each survey, to easily compare with the U.S. and Japan 
companies. 
2.3 Data collection 
Data used in this study are collected from the four companies mentioned above. The 
items are the same as those in the book of “the machine that changed the world”. Data 
collection is either direct or indirect. In Shanghai Volkswagen, with a friendly engineer‟s 
help, entering the assembly shop was possible and observing the production line became 
the reality. But visiting to the rest areas was unsuccessful. Hence all data was collected in 
the assembly shop and all questions were answered by engineers worked there. In 
Shanghai GM, the interview was done through visiting a senior manager in the company. 
However, some of the detailed data was not acquired from him, but from their web site. 
In Chongqing Changan Suzuki, the questions were answered through e-mail survey by a 
manager. For BYD automobile company, it was much harder to get the permission to 
visit their plant, and data was also collected by e-mailing an engineer, who helped to 
question her colleagues.   
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CHAPTER 3 CASE STUDY 
Shanghai Volkswagen, Shanghai GM, Chongqing Changan Suzuki, and BYD Auto 
Company are selected to represent Chinese automobile industry. The first three are joint 
venture companies, and the last one is a private company. In these four cases, Shanghai 
Volkswagen is the first joint venture company after Deng‟s reform and opening. 
Shanghai GM is the largest one whose sales jumped to 1,000,000 units in China in 2010. 
Chongqing Changan Suzuki is the first Chinese-Japanese joint venture company. BYD 
Auto Company is a domestic automobile company and it is also the biggest and the most 
successful private company. Four cases can reflect the real situation of Chinese 
automobile industry today. 
3.1Shanghai Volkswagen 
Shanghai Volkswagen was established in 1984 and started its operation in 1985. It is a 
Sino-German joint venture Company with the investment ratio of 50%:50%. Chinese 
government helped and supported this joint with a goal to improve the automobile 
industrial level in China, by introducing capital and new technology from oversea. This 
proposed win-win strategy achieved remarkable achievements in short time. Today, 
Shanghai Volkswagen has four production bases: three locate in Shanghai Anting 
International Automobile City with total area of 3,330,000 square meters; the other is 
located in Nanjing with 635,000 square meters. 
To 2009, Shanghai Volkswagen has the largest automobile production base in China. 
Based on its Volkswagen and Skoda brands, Shanghai Volkswagen now has SANTANA, 
PASSAT, POLO, TOURAN, LAVIDA, TIGUAN, and OCTAVIA, FABIA, HAORUI. 
Their products cover different market segments such as A0, A, B, SUV, etc. Total sales 
of all models in July 2008 and July 2009 are shown in Figure 10.  
Historically, Shanghai Volkswagen broke through one million cars in 1998. Four years 
later, Shanghai Volkswagen realized two million cars‟ production. Soon, three million 
cars were made in 2005, and four million cars were coming off the assembly line in 
January 2008. Subsequently, in another 22 months, Shanghai Volkswagen reached five 
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million cars. Today, Shanghai Volkswagen is accelerating its sustained growth in 
production and sales. The time of exceeding a number of million cars is shown Figure 11. 
 
Figure 3.1 Shanghai Volkswagen total car sales 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Car production of Shanghai Volkswagen in different years 
Shanghai Volkswagen has also focused on the technical development. The company 
insists on using top level equipment and technology in the world, and continues to keep 
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them upgraded: advanced automated press line, advanced laser welding technology, a 
large number of welding robots, two-sides galvanized steel, advanced cavity wax 
injection machine, precise water honing system, automated production line, dynamic 
testing techniques, modular production line, and advanced laser testing equipment. 
In addition, by following environmental standards, Shanghai Volkswagen effectively 
achieves “green production” and accomplishes the win-win prospect of economy and 
ecology. 
3.1.1 Assembly shop 
Shanghai Volkswagen is very sensitive to their technology exposure. However, with the 
help from a young engineer in the Engine Development Section in the R&D Center, our 
visit to the assembly shop became possible in January 2011.  
This assembly shop belongs to the First Plant of Shanghai Volkswagen, which locates in 
the same area as its headquarters. The First Plant has been producing Santana since 1985, 
and was renovated and expanded in 2001. At the same year, a new compact car - POLO 
was created here. Now the First Plant can produce Fabia, Jingrui and POLO series 
flexibly in the same production line. Stamping, welding, painting and assembly shops are 
the four major production workshops in the first plant. The total area is 363,147 square 
meters.  
An engineer who was a trainer for new workers in the assembly shop introduced us all 
their production lines. The shop was clean and well organized. The engine, transmission, 
front axle, front suspension were integrated into one module here. Modular chassis came 
from dollies, car bodies came from the other side, and all these were finally docked into 
the chassis. Basically no small parts were in sight. The only small parts were used for 
repairing purpose. Pre-installed modules, assembly line and assembly technology were 
the highlights of the shop. In this shop, there were totally 20 robots; they could 
automatically install all the mechanical parts and electrical circuits. They also had the 
most advanced tire screwing guns.  Antifreeze, brake fluid, driving wheel fluid were 
automatically filled at one time; electrical functions  were automatically tested; advanced 
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laser on-line testing equipment were also used; simulated rain storm testing technology 
and many other high technologies were fully adopted. Just as mentioned in their slogans: 
rigorous and careful management, the pursuit of excellence.  
This assembly line is a pride of the company. They showed their pride not only on their 
public documents, but also on their employee‟s face. They didn‟t like to be compared to 
others; they were proud of their own enterprise spirit. However, their assembly shop was 
not the most advanced one in the world. The most surprise was that Lean production was 
not used in this shop. Another important thing was that there was much idle time in the 
assembly line. The workers were waiting for the coming module parts. These young 
workers looked much tedious. The employees did not know what was “five why”. The 
questions for this study were gotten from this engineer, but he only knew a few.  
3.1.2 Department of procurement 
In this department, the most impressive thing was the modular parts existed everywhere. 
They called this a modular production line. When our visit was finished, a young 
engineer who worked in the Department of procurement gave a short introduction to their 
procurement process. It was noticed that Lean production was practiced well in this 
department. Enterprise Resource Planning (EPR), Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), and 
so on were their most popular tools during their work. However, the data could not be 
gotten from any single person, because each task belonged to a particular division.  But 
the engineer said that their online procurement helped them save time and cut cost, so 
they did not have in-house divisions anymore. In addition, they adapted international 
globe procurements. In-site bidding and online bidding allowed them to choose the best 
bidders with high quality and low price. 
Apparently Shanghai Volkswagen had the core competition of cooperation and success in 
this department. To achieve their goal, Shanghai Volkswagen had implemented a 
dynamic supply system which included eliminating the backward suppliers, introducing 
the potential suppliers, commending the outstanding suppliers and developing the reliable 
suppliers. They built the technology platform for the suppliers to allow them to 
participate in their workflow. This system also shared resources and information with 
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other departments to achieve other goals: first Shanghai Volkswagen started a new 
project to make the bidders competitive. Shanghai Volkswagen worked with the suppliers 
together and started from localization then to joint venture development. Soon they went 
into a new stage of modular development. Some major functional modules were finally 
included in this project: air conditioning system, exhaust system, seat system and so on. 
Second they established a forum for materials cost, so the cost problem could be solved 
creatively by optimizing the entire system. Last, they opened a project day when the 
suppliers could meet the customers and best understand their needs. Hence the suppliers 
not only focused on the parts, but also be concerned on creating the values for the final 
customers.   
3.1.3 Department of sales 
In this department, Shanghai Volkswagen dealed customers with Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM). They build connections between producers, dealers and customers. 
With more and more international cars coming into China, new models must bring 
impressive impact to the customers; also new challenge must be faced under the world-
wide competition. In this domain Shanghai Volkswagen had several practices: 
In a traditional market, brand was the only key assets. Uniqueness of the brand could be 
found by customers, but the communication to the customers was done only by dealers. 
This communication was usually not tracked and analyzed by the producer. As the 
customers were crucial to the market, the dealers had to find the uniqueness of their 
demands, and then to create a unique service. But this was a way lacking the support 
from producers, and a closed loop was not formed: producers and customers were 
independent to each other. To form a closed loop, Shanghai Volkswagen practiced CRM 
in their sales department.    
They first built a customer population and stimulated their purchasing intention by 
continuous communication. At the same time, a feedback mechanism was established to 
understand customers‟ intention and collect their information. In addition, during the 
different stages in customers‟ purchasing process, they provided the corresponding 
products and market information. All customers‟ information was then feedback to the 
43 
 
same database, and each customer had a unique lifetime files. With the gradually 
deepening communication, customers‟ information was getting into details. By 
aggregated analysis and data excavating, a system for market, products, customers, and 
sales was formed, which would guide Shanghai Volkswagen‟s new product planning and 
marketing strategy.  
Shanghai Volkswagen CRM plan included two targeted groups: vehicle end-users and 
dealers. The end-users included potential buyers and existing owners; it was also divided 
into private, government and company users. Dealers were the connection between 
Shanghai Volkswagen and the end-users. All products from Shanghai Volkswagen could 
not be handed directly to the end-users, but must be sold through the dealers. The dealers 
actually were the first level customers to Shanghai Volkswagen.   
To service these two groups, Shanghai Volkswagen built Customer Development Center 
(CDC) in 2002. Free service line could provide reply, record the complaints and feedback 
the customers‟ information on time. During this process, they discovered the purchasing 
intention of the potential customers and record their detailed information. They followed 
up the communication by giving more description and explanation to the interesting 
customers. At the same time, CDC was also responsible for verification of outgoing calls, 
updating customer information, collecting mail information, organizing marketing 
activities, and gathering price information. So far, CDC in Shanghai Volkswagen had a 
total of 70 persons to accomplish their work. In addition, they built a network for dealers 
and consumers to develop their relationship. 
Internet was another communication platform between Shanghai Volkswagen and their 
dealers. Dealers could get the customers‟ information developed and maintained by CDC. 
At the same time, dealers needed to feedback potential customers‟ information to CDC. 
Then CDC developed communication according to different situations to promote sales. 
Once a successful sale was done, the dealer was also obliged to feedback the customer 
and vehicle‟s information to CDC. Moreover, the most prominent feature in this network 
was the online training which could provide detailed product information, compare rival 
models and sales skills to help dealers understand the products and market better. In 
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addition, market activities of various models, the latest advertising documents and sales 
policies could be queried and downloaded here. The dealer could even point to the sale 
platform to order the promotional materials and gifts online. However, the dealers were 
required to feedback all information about their showroom and other activities to the 
workflow, so that Shanghai Volkswagen could conduct necessary evaluation. From 2004, 
396 dealers in Shanghai Volkswagen were connected to the internet and communicate 
with Shanghai Volkswagen in a daily base.  
Consumer network included potential customers and existing owners. For potential 
customers, Shanghai Volkswagen created a website showing all their models, so that 
customers who had purchasing intention could easily check the product information and 
download the products‟ images. Shanghai Volkswagen took full advantage of interactive 
media; they created beautiful product manuals in each site. The potential customers could 
virtually operate and enjoy the driving pleasure, thus the desire for buying was stimulated. 
On this basis, the site would further invite customers to register their personal 
information and online purchase intentions for CDC. This information would be 
introduced to dealers who want to develop ordinary customers into potential customers. 
For existing owners, the website was their club and their loyalty program channel. 
Existing owners could update their contact details and easily check all the information 
about their own car, so that they could refer to their friends. Also they could check their 
current club location to change gifts. Shanghai Volkswagen also requires all their 
suppliers to join their loyalty program; hence owners could enjoy their articles online 
such as car refrigerator, child safety seat and so on. Meanwhile, owners could learn about 
the latest club activities, services benefits and other information. CRM in Shanghai 
Volkswagen also included customer information management and customer relationship 
management. Its customer service center had set many communication tools such as 
telephone, direct mail, fax, email, short messaging service and internet. This system 
combined with the dealers‟ network and forms a consolidation marketing framework.   
Moreover, Shanghai Volkswagen had first launched “Techcare”.  This was a great service 
which integrates pre-sales and after-sales in the automobile industry. Under this service, 
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the customers could enjoy all service including buying, using, changing and welting the 
car. Shanghai Volkswagen hence realized a new industrial benchmark of service.  
3.2 Shanghai GM 
Shanghai GM was built in 1997. It was derived from Shanghai Automobile Industry INC. 
and the U.S. GM. The total investment was 1.52 billion US dollars. Each of them has 50% 
share. Shanghai GM posed three major production bases in Shanghai Pudong Jingqiao, 
Shandong yantai Dongyue, and Jiling Shenyang Beisheng. There were total four vehicle 
production plants. Shanghai Pudong Jingqiao located in Shanghai Pudong Economic 
Development Zone with an area of 550,000 square meters.  
Shanghai GM could produce Buick, Chevrolet, Cadillac and SAAB brands and other 
twenty products. It was the first one to realize flexible production line in China. In the 
Shanghai base, there were stamping, body, paint, and assembly plants. Shanghai GM 
used the most advanced car production line, equipment, and modular design. Flexible 
production line not only produced multiple models, but also meets the diverse needs from 
the customers including the sales, service and parts. They also implemented single-level 
market sales strategy to drive marketing and brand management. User-oriented policy 
made Shanghai GM response rapidly to market change and user demand. In 2010, they 
produced 103 million cars, surpassed Shanghai Volkswagen‟s 100 million cars. Year to 
year growth was 42.8%.  
In addition, Shanghai GM launched the “Green Future” strategy. The core of the strategy 
was to develop green products, built green system and took green responsibility. Through 
scientific and technological innovation, they brought green products of “better 
performance, lower power, less emissions” to Chinese consumers. Shanghai GM tried to 
play a leading role in business chain and created green industries for upstream and 
downstream ecosystems.  
The key of success for Shanghai GM was their unique management - they executed 
General Manufacture System (GMS) by learning Lean production in a new way in all 
their supply chain. They implemented integrated management to divide their 
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responsibility, utilized Milk Run to optimize the logistics. They developed CRM system 
to realize personalization service, and promoted green strategy to attract more suppliers. 
3.2.1 GMS system 
Shanghai GM was the only automobile company in China that practiced Lean production 
well. Together with flexible production, Shanghai GM formed its own Lean 
manufacturing system. This was a specific GMS. Standardization, total quality control, 
shortening the manufacturing cycle, and employee involvement were the four important 
and basic principles to run this system. These four principles complemented and 
promoted each other, and ultimately formed a virtuous circle. In fact, these principles in 
Shanghai GM were not only parts of their manufacturing system, but also the basic 
concepts from procurement to sales operations throughout all their production process. 
1, Standardization  
In the workplace, Shanghai GM implemented standardization which included designated 
placement, fixed working hours, standard operation, and use of visual markers. First, 
tools and materials were placed in the standard stations or positions where the workers 
could access them easily, so working time and waste of resources were minimized. 
Second, fixed working hours was carefully calculated to reduce unnecessary or no value 
time. Third, standard operation in the production process was performed to achieve 
standard products. Fourth, visual markers were used in operation which was similar to 
"traffic light": red to stop, yellow to slow, green to go. In terms of material labels, red is 
for the waste, yellow for the substandard, green for the qualified, gray for the products in 
line. In their workplace, they also took the red, yellow and green bins as prohibited 
(waste), postponed (pending), and released (pass) products. For the basic examination, 
there were also some simple colored blocks: red to be warned, yellow to be improved, 
green to be released. The adoption of these simple colors greatly improved the 
management efficiency.  
2, Total quality control  
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In the GMS system, quality was created rather than tested out. Quality was every 
employee‟s responsibility. The essence of this idea was that the quality lies on the 
manufacturing process, not just in the final testing sector. This was an active prevention, 
not a passive testing in the last step. At any time if the mistake was made, it was too late 
to be corrected. For example, a completed inspection report has already been made before 
assembly shop, but it still needed to be submitted after the assembly line. The overall 
quality control was also the basic principle: “do not accept defects, do not manufacture 
defects, and do not allow defects pass”. This principle was promoted on every station, 
whether it was a separate process or on the process for the next station. The customers 
from the next station did not accept the defects coming from the previous one. If the next 
station found any defective product, they had the right to not accept them. These 
principles were also used in all the supply chain. One simple example was that if in one 
step a screw was missed, this defective product would be sent to the yellow line, and red 
light would flash, siren would sound, and the whole production line would stop until a 
new screw was added. Or if a station had any problem that could not be solved, the 
workers could appeal for aid by rope or light, and the team leader or section chief should 
come immediately to help. The method of using the rope and light was a typical Toyota 
symbol. Although today‟s automatic machine had precise detection ability depending on 
the advanced IT system, but it was still not enough to prevent all defects. In Shanghai 
GM, quality concept was in every employee‟s mind deeply.  
3, Shortening manufacturing cycle 
Manufacturing cycle was a process from receiving customers‟ orders until delivering the 
final products to them. Shortening manufacturing cycle depended mainly on logistics and 
integration management, not on cutting the production line. This was because the 
production sector had little to be shortened as for technology and quality reasons. 
Logistics management for workshop materials was mainly through Kanban, re-packaging, 
address distribution, etc. Kanban and e-Kanban greatly reduce inventory. CKD 
distribution refered to the parts shipped from oversea by containers, then re-packed, sent 
to the domestic suppliers‟ warehouses, and finally to the production site. 
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The so-called integrated management was a more efficient and professional method in the 
core businesses system. They thought that limited resources must be concentrated on high 
value-added process running on the core business. Shanghai GM was the first enterprise 
in China adopting integrated management to achieve overall efficiency. This system 
separated all non-core business to supply companies, so that Shanghai GM only focused 
on automobile production, hence to reduce cost and improve competition ability.  
4, Employee involvement 
The most important elements in an enterprise were the people. Shanghai GM promoted 
the concept of employee involvement, and constantly inspired the employees to 
participate, while delegated power to them at the same time. Promoting employee‟s 
participation could not only encourage individual initiative, but also create a team to 
participate in the realization of the company‟s objective. In Shanghai GM‟s workshop, 
there was an area for each work group to take break. In this place, there were papers and 
boxes to collect the rationalization proposals. Each proposal adopted by the company 
would get material and spiritual rewards. Shanghai GM now had 88% employees who 
participated in the activity. However, Shanghai GM mostly emphasize on the employee‟s 
safety. For example, when a fire was happening in the factory, the workers did not 
advocate senseless sacrifice to preserve the company‟s property, but should take the right 
steps and promptly notify the fire departments and help them to extinguish the fire.  
Flexible concept was also reflected in the employee‟s training. Its purpose was to enable 
employees to be eligible in different positions and grasp more skills. The workers were 
not isolated in each station; they could easily change their positions in the production 
plants.  
3.2.2 Supply chain optimization 
Shanghai GM was a typical manufacturing enterprise; they needed more than 5400 parts 
for all auto models. Shanghai GM had 180 domestic and foreign suppliers including two 
import bases in North America and Brazil. In order to reduce the inventory and 
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transportation costs, Shanghai GM launched the Leading Logistics Management (LLM) 
project. This particular plan was divided into two steps: 
1, Analyze the vendors‟ sites and cargo capacity to optimize transport routes. Modeling 
software was used to develop the online analysis. Shanghai GM took all the domestic 
suppliers‟ locations and cargo volumes. Currently, 80% suppliers in Shanghai GM were 
located in the suburb of Shanghai; a small number of suppliers were located in Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang province. Some suppliers produced very large parts; they should directly 
deliver their parts to the factory; while others supplied smaller parts and need to be 
integrated in their network. 
2, Optimize the truck load by getting through a system: three-dimensional truck cargo 
load optimization system, which was a very technical one for lower transport costs. It 
could also be carried out by software. In addition, Milk run was also a critical method for 
cost saving.  
Milk run was a transportation mode under the pre-designed pickup line, in sequence from 
suppliers A, B, C to pick up their parts and finally send them to auto makers or parts 
Redistribution centers (RDC). It was operated in a fixed time every day. Trucks started 
from the manufacturing plant or distribution center to the first supplier to get the parts or 
raw materials, and then followed the pre-designed route to the second, the third and so on, 
until all materials were picked up. This eliminates the waste of returning empty trucks by 
each supplier. Meanwhile, parts and materials could be supplied timely; suppliers who 
had little goods do not need to wait until the truck was filled.  
In China, Shanghai GM was one of the earliest auto makers who adopted Milk run as a 
supplying operation. Instead of delivering parts by the suppliers themselves, logistics 
companies were used by signing contracts based on customer plant MRP. This could 
improve vehicles‟ loading rate, greatly reduced the travel distance and the number of 
returning empty trucks. This also effectively reduced the cost of suppliers‟ delivery and 
increases their agility and flexibility. From March 2003, Shanghai GM began to 
implement Milk run, and parts transportation costs savings were 3 million Yuan a year 
from then on, a decrease of 30%. 
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3.2.3 CRM system 
Shanghai GM had 510 dealers in China. These dealers were called 4S shops, which were 
“four-in-one” including vehicle sales (Sale), spare parts (Spare part), after-sales service 
(Service), and feedback (Survey). It was gradually introduced to China by the European 
exporters from 1998 and now was the core of the automobile franchise mode, because of 
its close relationship between the production and marketing, along with the beautiful 
shopping environment, brand awareness and strong advantages. Their averaged sale was 
2300 cars per year, including face to face sale and internet sale. The service of pre-sale, 
during the sale, and post-sale was getting stronger with the help of internet. Each 
customer could choose and buy their own favorite car online, and they could also make 
their own personalized choose, such as configuration, color, and place where they wanted 
to pick up the car. Moreover, the order from internet would be formed automatically into 
a production instruction by the system, then came into the flexible production line. At last, 
under the control of this system, this personalized car booked from internet would be 
delivered to customers perfectly on time. Another highlight was that customer could 
check the situation of their car in this system, whatever in the production line, in painting, 
or on the way of delivery, as they were using Customer Relationship Management system 
(CRM). IBM helped them create this system in 2002, so that the market competitive 
capacity in Shanghai Volkswagen could be gradually enhanced.  
In the implementation of CRM, their focus was the customer life cycle, which 
concentrated on the potential customer development process (Lead generation), the 
potential customer management process (Lead management), and the customer loyalty 
programs (Owner retention). The emphasis was the customers‟ information exchange and 
management, which was a question of how to break the customer information into useful 
pieces. 
First, CRM system took customers‟ information to explore existed problems. They 
subdivided the customers by data mining tools to analyze the services, response, 
customer satisfaction, loyalty and profit contribution, in order to effectively acquire 
customers and retain them. 
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Second, CRM deepened the process by feed-backing to the customers through advertising, 
promotion, cooperation activities, direct mail and other means to expand the customers 
list. Next step was to screen customers and further classify them for “potential customer 
management”. They developed a classification method for screening which was 
combined with the current computer system. This system applied not only to the existed 
customers, but also to the potential customers. 
Third, CRM system enhanced interaction with the customers. Shanghai GM not only 
provided overall management information to the external world, but also increased the 
company‟s sales through the interaction. Feedback from the leading distributors was also 
displayed. By this way, Shanghai GM achieved a customer loyalty index of more than 
60%, which mean that 60% customers would buy General Motors again and also would 
introduce GM to their friends. 
3.2.4 Green strategy 
For Shanghai General Motors, green strategy was a systematic project through the 
complete business chain. In their suppliers‟ selection, Shanghai GM and non-profit 
international organization "World Environment Center (WEC)” co-operated and made 
green criteria for suppliers‟ selection. They also provided specialized training to 
encourage suppliers to achieve “clean production, energy conservation”. 
Also, Shanghai GM made a request to the suppliers to save energy. For different 
suppliers, the request was different. The supplier‟s plant, equipment, production sites, 
standardized process were all green-evaluated to help them improve technology, reduce 
energy and raw materials consumption. They gave the award to the top 10 supplies to 
encourage their participation. 
Moreover, Shanghai GM proposed Green Future strategy. To realize their goals - better 
performance, lower power, less emissions, they launched new generations of green 
products series. Shanghai GM‟s 20 models ranked first in the joint venture companies in 
China. This fully demonstrated the great achievement of green product strategy. 
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Shanghai GM “Green Future” strategy also looked into the future. They were imagining a 
better life by 2030, and announced the 2011-2015 “Green Future” strategic plan. In the 
next five years, Shanghai GM would launch 12 high-performances, low-emission engines, 
which would concentrate on the 1.2L-2.5L range. By 2015 the overall fuel consumption 
and carbon emissions would be reduced by 15% based on the current situation. At the 
same time, electric, hybrid, plug-in hybrid vehicles‟ research and development were also 
included in this plan. 
3.3 Chongqing Changan Suzuki 
Chongqing Changan Suzuki was founded in June 1993. It is a quartet holding company: 
Chongqing Changan Automobile Co., Ltd holds 51%; Japan Suzuki Corporation holds 
25%; Japan Sojitz Corporation holds 14%; and Suzuki (China) Investment Co. Ltd holds 
the rest 10%.  
As a large automobile manufacturer, Chongqing Changan Suzuki Company covers a 
plant area of about 287,000 square meters.  It locates in Chongqing Banan district. It 
possesses Tianyu, Swift, Alto, Lingyang series with about 20 models.  
In production organizing, they introduced Suzuki‟s scientific management model. Lean 
Production was their eternal theme. JIT, Kaizen, VA, VE were fully implemented in their 
daily production. They emphasized on quality improvement and energy saving. They 
adhered to human-oriented and continuous improvement. Chongqing Changan Suzuki 
provided innovated, safe, energy saving and environmental friendly cars for Chinese 
customers. 
Chongqing Changan Suzuki strictly followed Japanese production and management. 
Their 85% employees were trained in Japan. In 2002, Modular production line was 
practiced. From then on, their management and execution system were involved in all 
supply chain including EPR, supply chain, distribution system and production workshop. 
With more competitors joining in Chinese market, Chongqing Changan Suzuki continued 
to practice Lean production to increase competitive ability. With the development of 
information technology, they applied this on all supply chains.  
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1, Changan Suzuki cooperated with the suppliers to release the supply arrangement plan 
which included three cycles. The first was the three-month long-term forecasts. The 
second is N*5 days of vehicles ordering program, which contained production model, 
color and numbers. These were also the days for delivery schedules. The third was an on-
site pulling program. Changan Suzuki sent the data from production site to the nearest 
suppliers and asked them to deliver parts according to the order.  
Currently their on-site pulling program mainly relied on JIT. In order to reduce the 
inventory cost, Changan Suzuki constantly optimizes their JIT plan. This plan included 
two kinds of parts: one was the closely integrated components such as bumpers and door 
handles; another was the large parts. Inventory time for these parts had been reduced to 
two hours per day.  
In addition, Changan Suzuki introduced the plan of “supply chain optimization”.   They 
issued a delivery order, and all supplies or third-party warehousing companies must 
deliver according to this order. However, some trucks were unloaded, and the logistics 
cost would eventually be transformed into the parts‟ price. In order to change this 
situation, Changan Suzuki also practiced Milk Run Delivery Management system to help 
third-party warehousing companies reduce cost. Changan Suzuki realized the information 
transformation by JIT, so the arrangement and adjustment for the production plan could 
be done on a reasonable allocated time.  
2, Changan Suzuki also put their attention to the customers‟ loyalty management. From 
2004, Changan Suzuki began to focus on the customer management. At that time, the 
department of information technology applied on line sales system. They just wanted to 
get the information about their dealers‟ inventory. But these data was from the dealers 
only, and Changan Suzuki could not get a clear forecast for the customers. Meanwhile, 
the management for their 4S shops was still in a fuzzy state. In the assembly plant, after 
cars were sold to the users, the sale of spare parts had a great profit. Changan Suzuki 
expected more users to buy the same spare parts. But Changan Suzuki could not control 
the price of these spare parts.  
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To solve this problem, they developed a project called customer service system plan. 
They controlled the dealers‟ sale price in this plan. The picking up records and future 
marketing plans from 4S shops were also fed back to Changan Suzuki.  Moreover, 
Changan Suzuki developed a set of standardized services, such as when the car should be 
maintained and when oil should be changed and so on. Department of customer service 
could quickly deal with customer complaints, and implement visiting back plan.  
In 2008, Chongqing Changan Suzuki introduced Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). 
This was the best way of connecting with the dealers. SOA was a new program that could 
provide the standard of different service modules.   
3.4 BYD Auto Company 
BYD (Build Your Dream) is a domestic enterprise in China. It was founded in 1995. At 
the beginning, they only had 20 employees. In just 15 years, BYD changed and 
developed rapidly into a world-class company of manufacturing IT facilities and 
electronic parts. In 2003, BYD became the world‟s second largest rechargeable battery 
maker. In the same year, BYD made the formal acquisition of Shaanxi Qinchuan auto 
company (in Xi‟an) and build BYD Auto Co., Ltd., from where it entered the field of 
automobile manufacturing, and started to develop nationally-owned brand car. 
BYD Auto adhered to the independent research and development, independent brand and 
models. They determined to revitalize the national automobile industry. At present, BYD 
has built Xi‟an, Beijing, Shenzhen, and Shanghai industrial bases for auto manufacturing 
and mold development. Auto research and development have reached the internationally 
advanced level.  
Modular production encouraged automobile companies to separate their parts 
manufacturing to the supplies. However, BYD started from retaking more parts 
production by themselves. Today, BYD has developed nine divisions, namely 11-19 
divisions which are especially on vehicles production and auto parts production. 
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11th Division is an auto manufacturing division. Two auto production bases in Xi‟an and 
Shenzhen are under this division. This division has 22,000 employees, five production 
plants including stamping, welding, painting, assembling, KD plant, and seven 
management sections such as general manager‟s office, human resource, and Department 
of planning, quality, cost, IE, and resource development.  
12th Division is BYD‟s mold center. Its responsibility is inside and outside mold design 
and production, including circumference, fenders, large stamping dies, dashboard, 
bumper, lights, door handles and other accessories. In this Division, there are two 
production bases in Beijing and Shenzhen. The total number of employees is 1200. It has 
seven mold plants which can provide users full service with process analysis, structural 
design, solid casting, computer digital control.  It can also produce all kinds of gages for 
assembly, sub-assembly and complex parts. Moreover, this division can accomplish the 
entire process including sub-module, designing, programming, planning, and testing.   
13th Division is responsible for injection and light parts. It has four production plants. 
There are about 6600 employees here.  
14th Division is the R&D center of core components for electric car. It owns an electric 
vehicle institute, a power plant, an electric plant, an electrical plant, a department for 
customer service, and a human resource. Currently, dual-mode electric car F3DM has 
been developed and it is the first one in the world. E6 also gets widely praise by 
customers.   
15th Division is the electronic base including research, development and production. It 
locates in Xi‟an and Shenzhen industrial parks. It has 11,000 employees. In this division, 
there are air conditionings, wiring harness, seat belt, instrumentation, multimedia, airbag, 
switching, etc. 
16th Division is one of the most important divisions. It focuses on auto R&D, and 
production as well. It has 500 engineers in the R&D team. The products cover auto 
accessories, steering machine, transmission, suspension, braking, seat, etc.  Also this 
division is responsible for welding, painting, and final assembly. Lots of factories belong 
56 
 
to this division including those make chair, brake, muffler, frame, suspension, sunroof, 
process equipment, structural parts, wheels, axles, drive shaft, etc. 
17th Division has 8970 employees. The main production bases are located in Shenzhen, 
Xi‟an, Huizhou and Changsha. They are R&D and production bases of engines and 
transmissions. The products series include BYD371Q, BYD473Q, BYD483Q, BYD488Q, 
BYD5T09, BYD5T19, BYD5RT10, BYD5RT14, BYD6T25, BYD6DT25, and 
BYD6DT35. These have been successfully carried on F0, F3, G3, L3, F6, M6, S6, S8 
models. 
Located in Huizhou and Xi‟an, 18th Division has 2600 employees.  In this division, there 
are rubber plant, plastic plant, surface decoration plant and other five management 
departments. They produce rubber, trim, rubber parts, hose, mounting, plastic particles, 
damping plate, brakes, IT coating, electroplating products, antifreeze, etc.  
In July 14, 2009 BYD established the 19th Division. BYD purchased Sanxiang autobus 
plant and built a new-energy bus production base. In this division, they mainly engage in 
R&D and production of passenger vehicles, especially buses. This is another major 
development in the new energy field. It has departments of production, planning, 
technology, quality, equipment, procurement, cost, and human resource.  
Among them, BYD Xi‟an is in the leading level of car production. Its total production 
capacity is 200,000 cars per year. F3 and F3R are made in this plant. „Motor City‟ in 
Shenzhen is a more modern one, with a total capacity of 300,000 cars. It is completing 
the second R&D center and will become an advanced auto production base. Beijing mold 
manufacturing center has gained the reputation of specialized, large-scale pattern in the 
molding industry.  
In 2006, BYD Group reached a sales income of 12.9 billion Yuan, an increase of 101% 
from the previous year. Automobile industry also achieved a remarkable level, the main 
model of F3 car reached a sale of 63,153, an increase of 472%. Sales revenue is nearly 50 
billion Yuan. F3 has also been exported for more than 5,000 to 16 countries and regions.  
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Since 2007, BYD F3 consecutively monthly sales have broken through one million. From 
May 2006 to June 2007, 100,000 vehicles left the assembly line. In just 14 months, BYD 
F3 got through the second threshold of survival for a mid-size sedan, and from June 2007 
to June 2008, BYD F3 in 12 months created the miracle sales of 100,000. As "Speed 
King," BYD became the first one within Chinese owned brands auto makers. 
In July 2007, BYD F3R - another midsize sedan hit the national market with 
extraordinary power, ultra-safe, and cool hatchback shape leading the new fashion. It sets 
off a new hatchback car sales storm in Chinese market. 
In March 18, 2008 BYD F6 sedan appeared in the high level business car market. The 
impact of self-owned brands, high class car market started. By then, BYD Auto already 
had F6, F3, F3R, F0, F8, DM dual-mode electric vehicles in the market. Their production 
capacity is 800,000 units. So far BYD Group has formed seven million square meters of 
industrial areas and becomes the top one within the self-owned brand car markers in 
China.  
It is worthy to mention that most BYD models come from imitation of others‟ technology. 
BYD F0 imitated Toyota Aygo. The front face of BYD F3 and BYD F3DM imitated 
Toyota Corolla; their rears imitated Honda City. BYD F3-R imitated Buick Excelle. The 
front face of BYD F8 (S8) imitated Benz SL500; their rear imitated Renault Megane CC. 
BYD F5 imitated Toyota Corolla. BYD G3 imitated Lexus ES350. BYD S6 imitated 
Lexus RX400. BYD T6 imitated Porsche Cayenne S. BYD M6 imitated Toyota Previa. 
The exterior of these cars are almost the same as the prototypes, but the interior materials 
are obviously cheaper. For example, F3 uses an engine of 1.5L Mitsubishi 4G15S, and 
the transmission is a manual D16. This combination is one of the most common auto 
power portfolios. Its advantage lies in its cheap but mature technology, economic and 
convenient maintenance. The power is enough for urban transportation. The highlight of 
F3 is its diverse configuration, including dual sunroof, anti-static antenna, decorative 
wood control center, console armrest, leather seats, luxurious multi-function steering 
wheel and so on. Although a large number of customers complain about its workmanship, 
many are still conquered by its cool appearance and low price.   
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In addition, BYD uses Modular production in the design, production and outsourcing. As 
its IT background, BYD has deeper understanding of Modular production. They think 
that the pronouncements of changing car body should be the same as changing shells of 
cell phone. This is a kind of Modular production. Even if BYD does not have the most 
advanced equipments, new management concept has already been reflected in their 
production.  
First, BYD has a special production model that is called “vertical integration”. The most 
important content of the model is integration, which means BYD try to master auto parts 
production as more as possible. Thus their downstream industry cannot be constrained.  
This model solves the biggest problem in Modular production – standardization and 
centralization of different parts. “Vertical integration” also includes upstream mold 
development and R&D research, which BYD already possessed. This model has brought 
much advantage to BYD in terms of cost and quality control. 
Second, BYD has already been successful in IT industry. IT industry is an industry of 
precision manufacturing. So BYD owns lots of production experience in precision 
manufacturing. Because of the application of precision manufacturing technology, 
Modular production was originally developed in IT field. No doubt, grasping this 
technology and production experience is another advantage of BYD.  
Third, BYD has advanced consciousness in their international business. BYD electric 
cars are going forward in China, and are marching the world market. They built several 
centers to develop and produce a variety of engines.  In addition, BYD merged some 
small or collapsing companies. In 2010, BYD even acquired a Japanese mold factory.   
Today, BYD has more than 40,000 employees worldwide, and a market value of more 
than 15 billion dollars. BYD Auto adheres to the international level, and committed to the 
development of fuel vehicles, electric vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles. BYD Auto 
continues to meet the customers‟ demand dependent on its distinctive technology and 
management methods. BYD is a leader in Chinese domestic automobile industry.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Data display and analysis 
In this study, only the data from Shanghai Volkswagen was collected onsite. Others were 
all from indirect investigation, i.e., through phone, email, or internet. The details of 
assembly shop, department of procurement, and department of sales were analyzed and 
displayed for Shanghai Volkswagen. For other three companies, the final results were 
directly presented without detailed data analysis, while the method used was the same for 
all four companies. 
4.1.1 Assembly shop 
In the book “The machine that changed the world”, Womack and his colleagues created 
„box scores‟ to present the productivity and the accurate in assembly shop. In this study, 
we used the same method to compare the assembly shop of Shanghai Volkswagen in 
2001 with Toyota Takaoka plant in 1989. We built „box scores‟ to know how productive 
Shanghai Volkswagen was. However, we did not know the „accurate‟ in this shop, which 
in Womack‟s book means „the number of assembly defects in cars as subsequently 
reported by buyers‟, as no data was collected from customers in China. Also, all 
presented data were estimated values because the four companies were not performing 
the same task in their assembly shops. The calculation of gross assembly hours per car 
was to divide the number of hours worked by all employees by the number of vehicles 
produced. This data actually evaluated the effort of the employees in the assembly plant.  
In the assembly shop of Shanghai Volkswagen, the production rate was 32 cars/h.  
170000 cars were produced in 2010 and 2000 employees‟ were working there at that time. 
However, the number of workers changed from month to month; hence all employees 
work hours were different from time to time. We took the averaged work days of 260, 
and 8 hours for each work day. So the worked hours by all employees were 
2000*8*260/170000=24.47 h/car. This data was higher than Japanese‟s in 1989, which 
was 16.8 h/car. 
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The size of the assembly shop in Shanghai Volkswagen was 43760 m
2
 (1 m
2
 = 10.764 ft
2
). 
For welding shop, we estimated that they had the similar area. So the space 
(sq.ft./vehicle/year) was 2*43760*10.764/170000=5.54. That was almost the same as 
Japanese‟s 5.7 in 1989. The size of repair area was 11.4 (% of assembly space), lower 
than the U.S. but higher than Japan in 1989. 
The number of workers was 900, which was larger than Toyota‟s 238 in 1989. However, 
this number was fluctuating in different months depending on the overall productivity. 
For example, the number of workers was 800 in December 2010, instead of normal 900 
mentioned above.  
Only 20 robots were used in the assembly shop. An engineer who visited Japanese 
company said that automation in Chinese automobile companies was not practiced well 
as that in Japan.  It was also mentioned that job rotation was not quite often because they 
only changed the workers who could study fast. Otherwise, that would be a waste of time. 
For the suggestion, not every employee would be questioned, but there were two 
meetings which were held before and after work every day to collect their suggestion, 
and each department had one communication conference every two weeks. This was not 
lower than that in Japanese‟s Lean production in 1989. The number of job classes was 6, 
lower than America and Japan in 1989.  
Training a new worker costs 160 hours, only half of Toyota‟s training time. Shanghai 
Volkswagen did not spend much time in training new workers. When production plan 
was large, many workers or new workers would be called back. When production plan 
was small, some workers would be laid off. Some of them only got several hours‟ 
training; this was one of the reasons why the automobiles quality was not good in China. 
Also, automation for each shop was not exactly the same. The engineer gave the 
estimated data: in welding shop, it was about 90%; in painting shop, about 80%; in 
assembly shop, about 10%. The automation level in welding shop seemed not 
significantly different from the U.S. and Japan in 1989, but in painting and assembly 
shop, it was much higher than them. The engineer also showed their Kanban and e-
kanban. E-kanban seemed to be not used very often.  
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During the subsequent three months, the data from the other three companies was 
collected through various ways, and are shown in Table 2, as well as the data from Japan 
and America. The productivity of Shanghai GM was 35cars/h, higher than Shanghai 
Volkswagen. In Chongqing Changan Suzuki it was 21cars/h, but BYD had the highest 
productivity of 100cars/h. Gross Assembly Hours per Car for Chongqing Changan 
Suzuki was 27.73, for BYD it was 41.6. Assembly space for Chongqing Changan Suzuki 
and BYD was 3.03 and 3.105 respectively. Size of repair area was 5 and 8.5 for these two, 
which was lower than Shanghai Volkswagen. The number of workers in Chongqing 
Changan Suzuki was 650, no large difference with Shanghai Volkswagen. However, 
BYD had much more workers, almost two times of Shanghai Volkswagen. Job rotation 
and classes for these two companies were the same as Shanghai Volkswagen. They all 
did not spend much time on workers‟ training.   
Table 2 Survey data from the assembly shop 
Company Japan  America SVW SGM Suzuki BYD 
Production rate 
(cars per hour) 
  32 35 21 100 
Gross Assembly 
Hours per Car 
16.8 25.1 24.47  27.73 41.6 
Assembly Space 
(sq.ft./vehicle/ye
ar) 
5.7 7.8 5.54  3.03 3.105 
Repair Rate   5%  5% 2% 
Size of Repair 
Area ( % of 
assembly space) 
4.1 12.9 11.4  5 8.5 
Number of 
Workers 
238  800-900  650 1800 
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Job Rotation 
(0=none, 
4=frequent) 
3 0.9 2  2 4 
Number of job 
Classes 
11.9 67.1 6   11 10-13-13 
Training of New 
Production 
Workers (hours) 
380.3 46.4 160  40 168 
Production 
Models/month 
    27 6 
Flexible 
Production Line 
  3-4  2 4 
Technical 
Requirement  
  Training 
school 
 Training 
school 
none 
Suggestions/Em
ployee    
61.4 0.4 50   0 
Absenteeism 5 11.7 0  0 0 
Stamping (% of 
direct steps) 
  80  45 50 
Welding （% of 
direct steps） 
86.2 76.2 90   80 
Painting （% of 
direct steps） 
54.6 33.6 80   40 
Assembly（% 
of direct steps） 
1.7 1.2 10   40 
*Data for Japanese and the U.S. are in 1989; Data for Chinese companies are in 2010 
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The above data showed that “running a factory” in Lean production was not practiced 
well in Chinese automobile companies; the layout in the assembly shop was the same as 
or less than Japan in 1989. The automation level was lower than Japan today. But the 
productivity was unusually high, especially in BYD Auto Company. This had already 
been pointed out by Womack in his book.  
In China, cheaper labors were still playing important roles. Although some private 
automobile companies were built later than joint venture companies, they did not use new 
and advanced equipments. Chinese automobile companies intended to use more workers 
than machines, although the workers were the critical point in Lean production.  
4.1.2 Department of procurement  
With the data from the departments of procurement in all four companies, a survey was 
made and shown in Table 3. 
In this department, Die change time in Shanghai Volkswagen was 20 minutes, longer 
than Japanese but shorter than American in 1989. The machines per worker were 4, more 
than Japanese in 1989. The inventory level was 6 days, which was longer than Japan‟s 
1.5 days but shorter than America‟s 8.1 days. But engineering carried out by suppliers 
was more than 90%. Compared with Toyota‟s 51%, Shanghai Volkswagen realized the 
modular parts outsourcing successfully. However, Shanghai Volkswagen did not have the 
data for parts defects.  
Number of suppliers was 320 for Shanghai Volkswagen and 250 for Chongqing Changan 
Suzuki, more than Japanese in 1989.  For Engineering carried out by suppliers (%), three 
joint venture companies all realized their outsourcing. However, a big surprise was BYD. 
While other companies tried to use more suppliers to reduce their in-house assembly, 
BYD was reducing this number fast. Now it only had 8 suppliers, and only 4% parts was 
produced by the suppliers. This difference is shown in Figure 12, 13 and will be 
discussed later.  
 
64 
 
Table 3 Survey data from the department of procurement 
Company Japan America SVW SGM Suzuki BYD 
Die change times 
(minutes) 
7.9 114.3 20  8 3-4 
Machines per 
worker 
7.4 2.5 4  3 3-4 
Inventory levels 
(days) 
1.5 8.1 6  7 2 
Engineering carried 
out by suppliers (% 
total hours) 
51 14 90  83 4 
Number of 
suppliers per 
assembly plant 
170 509 320  250 8 
Proportion of parts 
delivered just-in-
time (%) 
45 14.8 80  50 90 
Proportion of parts 
single sourced (%) 
12.1 69.3 80  60 85 
Inventory level 
(days, for 8 parts) 
0.2 2.9 0  10 0 
Market shares in 
China (%) 
  19 20.1 2.2 28.9 
*Data for Japanese and the U.S. are in 1989; Data for Chinese companies are in 2010 
Proportion of parts delivered just-in-time (%) was 80 for Shanghai Volkswagen, much 
higher than Japan‟s 45 in 1989. Proportion of parts single sourced (%) was 80 for 
Shanghai Volkswagen, still higher than Japan‟s 12.1. For Chongqing Changan Suzuki 
and BYD, these data were close to that of Shanghai Volkswagen. For inventory level of 8 
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parts, Shanghai Volkswagen and BYD had reached zero. However, Chongqing Changan 
Suzuki was still in a high 10 days. 
In this department, the total inventory level was higher than Japan in 1989. Engineering 
carried out by suppliers (%) was also higher. Three joint venture companies realized their 
outsourcing very well. Their suppliers made most parts, and their plants focused on 
assembly process. Most Chinese suppliers built their plants beside auto companies and 
tried to reach JIT delivery. 
 
Figure 4.1 Number of components suppliers in 2010 for four representative companies 
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Figure 4.2 Engineering carried out by suppliers in 2010 for four representative companies 
4.1.3 Department of sales 
The number of dealers in Chinese companies was much less than that in the U.S. and 
Japan in 1989. Car producer and dealers were connected much closely here. Sales volume 
of each dealer was much more than that in the U.S. and Japan in 1989, except Chongqing 
Changan Suzuki.  With the data from the departments of sales in all companies, a survey 
was made and shown in Table 4. 
Only a few Chinese automobile companies exceeded the sales quantity of 1 million cars 
in a year, most others were still in small scales. However, the total volume was much 
larger than that in Japan in 1989. As presented previously, Modular production, imitation 
and IT helped Chinese automobile industry realized great leap, which will be further 
discussed in the following sections. 
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Table 4 Survey data from the department of sales 
Company Japan America SVW SGM Suzuki BYD 
Sales in 
2010 
  800000 1030000 200000 800000 
Number of 
dealers 
1621 16300 497 510 1020 1000 
Car sales per 
dealer 
222 393 2300 2020 197 800 
*Data for Japanese and the U.S. are in 1989; Data for Chinese companies are in 2010 
4.2 What’s more 
1，In the book “The machine that changed the world”, the author pointed out that there 
were poor producer, worse quality but very high productivity in developing countries. It 
is very true in today‟s China. In this survey, Chinese private companies were found to 
have higher productivity but poor quality.   
2, In the late 1980s, Lean production had been proved to be a feasible way to improve the 
productivity and cut the cost. However, until today, Lean production has not yet been 
practiced well in China. The U.S. and Japanese joint venture companies‟ practice of Lean 
production was the best and has their own ways. Other companies such as European joint 
venture companies also introduced and implemented Lean production, but in Chinese 
domestic enterprises, Lean production was poorly practiced.  
3, Another surprise was the number of workers. In the book “The machine that changed 
the world”, Lean production defeated Mass production by reducing the number of 
workers. But in China, the number of workers was 4 times of Toyota‟s. This might be 
explained as the high cost of labors in the developed countries, where they must find 
some ways to reduce the workers as much as possible to cut the cost. In China, labors are 
still cheap and their overtime work is almost free. 
68 
 
4, In these investigations, the department of R&D was not mentioned, as this is a secret 
for every company. Fortunately, the young engineer who accompanied us was working in 
the department of R&D in Shanghai Volkswagen. She was a member of the engine 
research group. Even though she did not know many details about our questions, she said 
that the level of R&D in Shanghai Volkswagen was still very low from her opinion. The 
number of all Models was 7, and their own brand was only LAVIDA, with all design still 
coming from Germany. The agreement of joint-venture companies was that Chinese 
partner was not allowed to participate in car design. 
5, Lean production was practiced better in Shanghai GM than in Shanghai Volkswagen. 
Japanese joint venture companies were also good executors. Shanghai GM surpassed 
Shanghai Volkswagen in short 13 years. This phenomenon indicated that Lean 
production was still a good management method, although in China it was difficult to 
practice. This will be discussed later.  
6, Surprising findings were within Chinese private automobile companies. In only 13 
years, the market shares of self-owned brands were 28.22% (Figure 8). BYD is on the top 
of them, which occupies 28.9% market shares. In short 8 years, BYD becomes the top 
one of private carmakers. When many companies are trying to transfer parts‟ 
manufacturing to suppliers, BYD tries to produce everything by themselves. Another 
successful point of BYD is the imitation from Japanese models. Their new models are 
mostly copied from Toyota and Honda. This imitation helps them realize fast 
development without taking much detour. Moreover, a large amount of cheap labors are 
used. They divide the production line into single steps which can be easily operated by 
labors. This approach not only solves the production problems, but also saves a lot of 
money. They utilize Chinese rich and cheap labor resources to reduce the cost and 
improve their competition. 
4.3 Discussion  
In the development of Chinese automobile industry, Mass production was not brought in 
because of historical reason. Lean production was still new and needed to be improved. 
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Modular production realized great leap for automobile productivity and reduced the cost. 
Imitation helped new automobile products emerge promptly. 
4.3.1 Lean production in China 
Interfered by the planned economy, Mass production was not introduced into China. 
Although Lean production has been spread in developed countries since 1980s, it is still 
new for Chinese, especially for those domestic automobile companies.  
Lean production not only made Japan automobile industry achieved great leap in 1960s 
and 1970s, but also let the U.S. companies catch up with Japanese by learning this 
method in 1990s. Hence it is known as „The machine that changed the world‟. However, 
in China until now, only Shanghai GM is a good learner. Chinese domestic car producers 
are still in their early step of adopting Lean production, and effective practice is rare. 
A typical example is FAW.  In 1978, FAW sent some people to learn Lean production in 
Toyota, then invited Taiichi Ohno to give lectures about Toyota production system in 
their factory. Soon FAW launched a pilot production line. At that moment, FAW set off a 
wave of learning Lean production. But later Lean production disappeared. In 1990, FAW 
transmission shop introduced LF06S line, Lean production was reintroduced. This time 
the productivity was significantly improved. But Lean production had not been spread 
widely. In 2002, FAW specially set off a leading group to Japan to continually learn Lean 
production again. However, today FAW is still in the learning stage without much 
improvement (Sheng, 2007). 
Is Lean production in China really hard to be practiced? Actually, Womack and his 
colleagues had already concluded that good executing of Lean production should have 
their own innovation rather than blindly cling to traditional ways. Why could Lean 
production not be sustained or successful in China? Professor Ershi Qi in Tianjin 
University, in his speech of “Lean production in China”, concluded that Lean production 
has a unique set of techniques, such as Kanban, JIT, standard operation, etc.  Also Lean 
production requires the workers achieve the detailed tasks, and the base philosophy of 
continue improvement must be persisted.  This method also requires maximization of 
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eliminating visible and invisible waste. However, in actual practice in China, many 
companies only copy some pieces of this method such as Kanban, TQC, MRII, etc., and 
the essence of this method is neglected.  
Lean production in Toyota is not only a management system, but also a full participation, 
thinking and continuous improvement. Lean production is the micro-organization in the 
workshop production and a manufacturing model. Professor Qi thinks that Chinese 
enterprises are not in the same management level as western and Japanese enterprises. So 
the application of advanced management system in China cannot be copied in the same 
way. At the same time, even if Lean production is strongly advocated in technology field, 
latecomer is unrealistic to reach the same high level in management field.  
According to this thought, Lean production is an idea and a concept. It is not a line or 
product that can be copied. Different enterprises should have different models. However, 
there are still two possible ways to implement Lean production in China: first is the 
leader‟s strong support, which is crucial in China; second is the interdisciplinary 
cooperation. Successful implementation of Lean production relies not only on inter-
departmental cooperation, but also on collaboration with suppliers, market forecasters 
and inventory managers. Therefore, a successful supply chain management is also the key 
to implement Lean production.  
4.3.2 Modular production in China 
Modular production actually was applied in developed countries first. The automakers in 
these developed countries used many modules including cockpit modules, rear axle 
modules, and door modules which were made by their suppliers oversea, and sent directly 
to the final assembly line. Western automakers performed outsourcing well because they 
wanted to lower the labor cost, reduce the investment and risk, and cut the first-tier 
suppliers (Takeishi & Fujimoto, 2001).  However, with the development of modular 
supply, auto parts purchasing system became complex and some problems arise, 
especially the loose structure of the supply chain. Suppliers and manufacturers could not 
coordinate well in some fields. Auto production plants focused on their own interests, not 
on the suppliers‟. They wanted to ensure adequate parts in inventory to stabilize the 
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continuity of production. Hence, manufacturers‟ difficulty had been transferred to their 
suppliers, whether in Lean production or Modular production.  Suppliers had to increase 
their inventory to meet the supply requirement. This situation could not achieve the win-
win strategy. The overall competitiveness of supply chain in automobile industry was 
getting weak. Under this structure, the suppliers‟ financial pressure was always high; they 
might lose the willing for new products development and efficiency improvements, and 
this might also affect the products‟ quality. In the end of 2009, Toyota required its 
suppliers to reduce 30% parts cost in the following three years. This fact might explain 
the recent quality problem in the “Toyota crisis” (Shang, 2010) 
Modular production was not practiced perfectly in western countries.  However, all joint 
venture companies in China, either from the U.S., Europe, Japan, or Korean, achieved 
unexpected success with Modular production.  In the early 1980s, when first joint venture 
company was introduced into China, they started KD assembly immediately. This was 
one form of the Modular production. At that time, the concept of Modular production had 
not been introduced into China yet, except cockpit modules. Today Chinese not only use 
Modular production in production line and supply chain, but also in car design. Moreover, 
module concept has been expanded to auto sales. Car trading parks have been built in 
some cities. In those parks, some dealers only sell, some others only repair. But no matter 
in which shop, if they sell the same cars, customers can enjoy all service the same way as 
in a 4S shop. As a result, future dealers are not investing to build 4S shops, but rather to 
provide the whole process of sales and services by modular marketing concept.  
4.3.3 New direction in China 
Cheap labors still exist in China. This is one of the reasons why Lean production is not 
practiced well. This is also the reason why the assembly hours per car in all Chinese 
automakers are high. For this reason, when automobile companies in the developed 
countries try to utilize their suppliers, Chinese carmakers started to make auto parts all by 
themselves.  
BYD is the most representative one. In the past few years, BYD brands are the hottest in 
China. It achieved breakthroughs in many points. However, its management model is 
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incompatible with Lean production, especially in workers and parts management (Tang & 
Peng, 2008).  
Chuanfu Wang, BYD founder, is very good at low-cost innovation. Many of his ideas 
and practices are anti-traditional. For example, he hires a large number of workers to 
replace automated machines; he diversifies the company‟s business; he uses imitation to 
increase the competitive ability.  
1, BYD does not use large-scale automated production equipments. In their production 
lines, numerous workers are used. Compared to frequent and large investment to 
permanent assets, an increase of workers is more flexible and acceptable. They fixed 
workers‟ positions in the lines to assemble the components efficiently, to improve the 
accuracy, and to ensure good quality. Different from others, BYD also split some 
assembly lines; each station does one specific task. Even some major works of the car 
production are done manually. They use robots only in the places where human cannot 
access.  
2, After 1990s, the world‟s major automobile manufacturers tried to improve outsourcing 
in order to increase efficiency and reduce risk. However, BYD does the opposite way. 
According to Chuanfu Wang‟s statement, almost all ancillary parts such as shock 
absorbers, seats, lights, wipers, etc., can be produced partially or entirely by BYD itself. 
He also believes that a strong capacity in design and development of mold manufacturing 
is the key factor in modern manufacturing enterprises. This is an important way to 
achieve rapidly product conversion. In addition, introducing new materials and new 
technologies can help BYD shorten the production cycle, stable product quality and 
provide more various products.  
3, Reverse development is a BYD-style imitation.  The so-called “reverse development” 
is to dismantle similar products from other companies, learn them, and develop BYD‟s 
own products. By this way the cost can be saved up to one-third. In order to produce 
vehicles in the shortest time, BYD spent tens of millions Yuan every year to buy the 
newest models in the world. In Shenzhen BYD factory, cars can often be seen wearing a 
“trial” license like Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Lexus, Toyota, and Honda. BYD-style 
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imitation is different with other companies. They concentrate their limited resources on 
the high-quality products; they select the best-selling products; they save costs and 
control quality. In China, latecomers all adapt imitation, but BYD is the best among them.  
However, automobile industry is going forward continuously. The biggest advantage of 
the machines is to guarantee the consistency of quality. Once the industry comes into the 
next stage such as electric vehicles and new energy, artificial advantage may no longer 
exist. Sooner or later, BYD will return to automatic road. Actually, BYD is already 
facing some troubles - patents problems. Imitation grasps the success quickly, but also be 
grasped by the lawsuits. In order to bypass intellectual property issues, BYD set up a 
team of hundreds people to study global patents, and also study non-patented 
technologies. They are trying integration and transformation of the patented techniques. 
At the same time, BYD begins to apply a large number of its own patents. In 2009, BYD 
became the third largest patent applicant in Shenzhen city.  
From Mass production, Lean production to Modular production, Chinese domestic 
automobile companies are still in the initial learning stage. Lean production cannot be 
simply copied, it requires a combination of cooperated spirit, good habits, consumer 
attitudes and other factors. However, with the help of IT technology, Modular production 
is fast accepted and well practiced in China.  
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CONCLUSION 
This study first reviewed the development of automobile industry in the world, and 
focused on Chinese automobile industry laterly. A large number of automakers coexist at 
the same time but only a few of them are in large scales. Up to date, almost all big 
automobile companies in the world have built their branches in China, but Chinese 
domestic companies are the fastest ones in terms of development and innovation.  
The management and production level in China is still low. Mass production did not 
introduce in China because of history reason.  Lean production has come into China 30 
years ago, but not practiced well until today. Modular production is being spread fast in 
China, as it can shorten the manufacture process, reduce investment, and cut the cost. 
Information technology is playing more important role along with the time going.  A new 
but special trend is that some private companies are using more workers instead of 
machines, which function is still in argument.  
Chinese automobile market is much larger than any other country today, not only in 
manufacturing ability, but also in consumers‟ market. In one aspect, automobile industry 
still has much space to develop; but in another aspect, many serious problems may be 
hidden under this great prosperity.  
The development of automobile industry in different countries has different 
characteristics because of their different economic basis and historic situation. The U.S. 
overcame Europe relying on Mass production; Europe regained overlord by outsourcing; 
Japan beat the U.S. and Europe with Lean production; China surpassed the U.S., Europe 
and Japan by Modular production, as well as cheap labors, imitation, and huge domestic 
market. Simple copy cannot achieve high and long-term development; only innovation 
can synchronize with the world‟s fast steps.    
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APPENDICES 
APPENDICE A: MAJOR QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS (51) 
Assembly shop (21) 
1. Gross Assembly Hours per Car 
2. Adjusted Assembly Hours per Car 
3. Assembly Defects per 100 Cars 
4. Assembly Space per Car 
5. Inventories of Parts (average) 
6. Productivity (vehicles/hour) 
7. Quality (assembly defects/100 vehicles) 
8. Space (sq.ft/vehicle/year) 
9. Size of Repair Area (as % of assembly space) 
10. Inventories (days for 8 sample parts) 
11. % of Work Force in Teams 
12. Job Rotation (0=none, 4=frequent) 
13. Suggestions/Employee 
14. Number of Job Classes 
15. Number of Workers 
16. Training of New Production Workers (hours) 
17. Absenteeism 
18. Stamping (% of direct steps) 
19. Welding (% of direct steps) 
20. Painting (% of direct steps) 
21. Assembly (% of direct steps) 
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Department of product engineering (13) 
1. Average Engineering Hours per New Car (millions) 
2. Average Development Time per New Car (in months) 
3. Number of Employees in Project Team 
4. Number of Body Types per New Car 
5. Average Ratio of Shared Parts 
6. Supplier Share of Engineering 
7. Engineering Change Costs as Share of Total Die Cost 
8. Ratio of Delayed Products 
9. Die Development Time (months) 
10. Prototype Lead Time (months) 
11. Time from Production Start to First Sale (months) 
12. Return to Normal Productivity after New Model (months) 
13. Return to Normal Quality after New Model (months) 
 
Department of procurement (15) 
1. Die Change Times (minutes) 
2. Lead Time for New Dies (weeks) 
3. Job Classifications 
4. Machines per Worker 
5. Inventory Levels (days) 
6. No. of Daily JIT Deliveries 
7. Parts Defects (per Car) 
8. Engineering carried out by Suppliers (% total hours) 
9. Supplier Propriety Parts (%) 
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10. Black Box Parts (%) 
11. Assembler Designed Parts (%) 
12. Number of Suppliers per Assembly Plant 
13. Inventory Level (Day, for 8 Parts) 
14. Proportion of Parts Delivered Just-in-Time (%) 
15. Proportion of Parts Single Sourced (%) 
 
Department of Sales (3) 
1. Sale for 2010 
2. Number of Dealers 
3. Car Sales per Dealer 
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APPENDICE B: CAR BRANDS IN CHINA 
9 German brands 
 
奥迪   奔驰   宝马  
 
 
保时捷 大众  精灵  
 
 
迈巴赫   迷你  欧宝  
 
 
 
14 Japan and Korean brands 
 
本田    丰田   光冈  
 
 
雷克萨斯    铃木 马自达  
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讴歌  日产  斯巴鲁 
 
 
三菱  英菲尼迪  起亚  
 
 
双龙      现代  
 
10 America brands 
 
别克  道奇  福特  
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GMC  悍马  吉普  
 
 
凯迪拉克   克莱斯勒 林肯 
 
 
雪佛兰  
 
 
21 Europe brands 
 
标致   雷诺  雪铁龙  
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阿斯顿·马丁 宾利   捷豹  
 
 
莲花  路虎   劳斯莱斯 
 
 
阿尔法·罗米欧 布嘉迪  法拉利  
 
 
 
 
 
 兰博基尼  蓝旗亚 玛莎拉蒂 
 
 
依维柯 柯尼赛格 萨博 
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沃尔沃  斯柯达  
 
 
 
64 Chinese-owned brands 
 
安驰   宝龙  北汽 
 
 
奔腾   比亚迪  长安(轿车)  
 
 
长安(微车) 长城  长丰  
 
 
昌河  大迪  东风 
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东风风神 帝豪  东南  
 
福迪   富奇   福田  
 
 
风行  广汽日野 哈飞  
 
 
汉江    海马   海马(商用车) 
 
 
华普   红旗  华泰 
 
 
航天圆通 汇众  吉奥  
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金杯   江淮   吉利  
 
 
江铃   金龙  江南  
 
开瑞   陆风  力帆 
 
 
莲花（青年） MG  美亚  
 
 
庆铃  全球鹰 奇瑞  
 
 
瑞麒   荣威  曙光 
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双环  上海英伦 天马  
 
 
五菱  威麟  新大地  
 
新凯   新雅途 野马 
 
 
一汽  永源  中华  
 
 
中客华北 中顺  众泰  
 
 
中兴 
 
